From: peter.allan@aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: da49b368373115914af64e7a674d0f401b9b28622b08d9d2c12cdbc0566936a5
Message ID: <9609131255.AA26331@clare.risley.aeat.co.uk>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-13 17:56:56 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 01:56:56 +0800
From: peter.allan@aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan)
Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 01:56:56 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: really (?) undetectable crypto
Message-ID: <9609131255.AA26331@clare.risley.aeat.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> Jim_Miller@suite.com wrote on CP:
>
> Most everybody on the list is familiar with the technique of hiding
> encrypted messages in the LSBs of image files. Personally, I would not
> use such a technique because don't I believe it's really undetectable. I
> assume, without proof, that the LSBs of images files have statistical
> properties that are sufficiently different from encrypted data that a
> clever person could determine whether or not an image file contained an
> imbedded encrypted message.
>
Not to mention 7 out of 8 bits may reveal the image to be a library one
your enemy has access to. The changes will betray the stego.
Your own scanned snapshots may be safer from this point of view.
> Fortunately, there are other steganographic techniques that, I believe,
> are undetectable. The trick is to hide your encrypted bits in other
> encrypted bits.
>
> trick #1) Let's say you want to send a short encrypted message via a
> communications channel that only allows cleartext messages with optional
> MD5 message hashes. You can construct cleartext messages, via
> trial-and-error, such that the first 4 or 8 bits (or more, if you have the
> time) of the MD5 hash match the first 4 or 8 bits of your encrypted
> message.
>
> Since the bits in an MD5 message hash are presumably cryptographically
> random, there should be no way to tell if some of the bits combine to make
> an encrypted message.
What about Walter making insignificant changes to the cleartext and
replacing the hash with the new hash? Because you are using an unkeyed
hash (and not a sig) he can do that and foul up the stegomessage (not
that he'll yet be sure there is one).
> trick #2) Let's say you are allowed to use 40 bit encryption, but nothing
> stronger. As in trick #1, you can pre-compute plaintext messages such
> that the first 4 or 8 of the bits in the output of the government-approved
> 40 bit encrypted data match the first 4 or 8 bits of your hidden encrypted
> message.
>
Walter can still play silly spooks with your stego if he breaks the 40-bit encryption.
The cyphertext/plaintext ratio looks like getting really huge too. Your messages
must all arrive, and retain the right order.
-- Peter Allan peter.allan@aeat.co.uk
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1996-09-13 (Sat, 14 Sep 1996 01:56:56 +0800) - really (?) undetectable crypto - peter.allan@aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan)