From: Declan McCullagh <declan@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 1996 13:56:54 +0800
To: Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon@citenet.net>
Subject: Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
In-Reply-To: <9609261727.AA03280@cti02.citenet.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.960926165048.8310C-100000@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more 
general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state. 
Whatever you want to call it.

To prevent it, governments will ban both. A criminal law, passed in the
wake of say a bombing this fall in Washington, DC, banning nonescrowed
crypto. (Freeh will assert he has evidence the terrorists used PGPhone.)
And another law banning online anonymity. 

What then, Mr. Bell?

-Declan




On Thu, 26 Sep 1996, Jean-Francois Avon wrote:

> On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote:
> 
> > If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed,
> > I agree.  I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more
> > ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters
> > shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against
> > them by governments, given their modus operandi.
> 
> I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand 
> the nature of it.  I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view 
> that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not 
> guaranteed at all.  As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing 
> will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable.  
> 
> Here is the post I wrote earlier:
> 
> ------- earlier post -------
> 
> jim bell recently wrote:
> 
> > Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be
> > deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it,
> > and soliciting donations against them.  
> 
> I don't agree here.  It would all be a matter of timing, unless the
> number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces
> would be able to destroy them.  You have to realize that if the money
> is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of
> being paid are not too good.  Just play the game "Command and Conquer"
> for a while and you'll see.  Money is fuel.  Don't run off of it!
> 
> For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of
> the concept*  would have to be a covert operation.  Servers could come out in
> public light when their number be large enough to warrant a
> strike on anybody trying to eliminate them.  Same for the
> publication of the name of the individuals operating the server.
> 
> To me, this seems obvious.  Comments?
> 
> To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of
> software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but
> that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would
> have be designed.
> 
> (Pardon my ignorance of the net here)
> 
> The server need not to be a unique address.  Actually, the
> prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la
> Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which
> would be required to re-assemble the original prediction.  This
> assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message.
> 
> If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of
> thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer
> location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the
> prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any 
> govt.
> 
> Comments?
> 
> ----- end of earlier post -----
> Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada
>  DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee
>     Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal
>  JFA Technologies, R&D consultant
>     physicists and engineers, LabView programming
> PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon
> ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 
>  
> 


// declan@eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan@well.com //