1996-09-18 - Re: The GAK Momentum is Building…

Header Data

From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles@netbox.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e8e4a97b7a689e18b6ed8f1857a323ba61e6f50cc7d02c7e82487998c059f423
Message ID: <3.0b19.32.19960918032950.007163ac@pop.ricochet.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-18 14:14:48 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 22:14:48 +0800

Raw message

From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles@netbox.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 22:14:48 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The GAK Momentum is Building...
Message-ID: <3.0b19.32.19960918032950.007163ac@pop.ricochet.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>However, making the government a _required_ part of such plans implies a
>>motive that is not at all the same as what companies wish (mostly,
>>disaster recovery).
>
>the distinction lies in the terminology. what does it mean, "required
>part of the plan". if it essentially amounts to nothing more than 
>the government saying, "you must give us keys when we present you
>with a subpoena/warrant", then that's no different than the system
>we have today.

Hmm. The government sure is putting a lot of effort into moving us to a
system that you say is "no different than the system we have today." As far
as I can tell, you're the only one who thinks that. The government thinks
that GAK is a big change, civil libertarians think GAK is a big change ..
but you're welcome to call it "status quo" if it suits you. 

There's a world of difference between the government subpoena-ing something
from me, where I can delay disclosure until I've exhausted my legal avenues
to challenge disclosure, and the government demanding data from an at best
disinterested third party who cares not at all if I get my day in court
before they disclose. With the second scenario, I'm forced to try to
"unring the bell", and somehow limit the spread of otherwise
private/confidential data in a community (law enforcement) which is
organized to collect and retain information. Ha, ha. Given today's Congress
and Supreme Court, there's probably precious little chance that keys
disclosed prematurely or erroneously won't be used to collect evidence
which will be admissible despite the lack of meaningful opportunity to
challenge the "recovery" of a key.

--
Greg Broiles                |  "We pretend to be their friends,
gbroiles@netbox.com         |   but they fuck with our heads."
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |
                            |






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