1996-09-12 - Re: Panix attack

Header Data

From: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Message Hash: fba98deab9cc83a4fc5bfeda80dea0a2cc7951c4c0cf40b721e441192532992d
Message ID: <199609122021.QAA07296@jekyll.piermont.com>
Reply To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.960912152105.966A-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-12 23:12:29 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 13 Sep 1996 07:12:29 +0800

Raw message

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 1996 07:12:29 +0800
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Subject: Re: Panix attack
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.960912152105.966A-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Message-ID: <199609122021.QAA07296@jekyll.piermont.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Simon Spero writes:
> This ensures that there's at least a traceable return address for the 
> connection. Sort of like photuris cookies but without the forced RTT delay

Not really. The genius of the Photuris cookie is that it induces no
state at all in the responder, thanks to crypto tricks.

I agree, though, that you can harden hosts against TCP floods.

Perry

Thread

• Return to September 1996

• Return to ““<pstira@escape.com>” <pstira@escape.com>”
• Return to “jya@pipeline.com (John Young)”
• Return to ““Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>”

• Return to “Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>”

• 1996-09-12 (Fri, 13 Sep 1996 04:50:07 +0800) - XPA_nix - jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
  • 1996-09-12 (Fri, 13 Sep 1996 06:24:31 +0800) - Re: Panix attack - Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
    • 1996-09-12 (Fri, 13 Sep 1996 07:12:29 +0800) - Re: Panix attack - “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
  • 1996-09-18 (Wed, 18 Sep 1996 12:27:22 +0800) - Re: XPA_nix - ”<pstira@escape.com>” <pstira@escape.com>
    • 1996-09-18 (Thu, 19 Sep 1996 06:44:01 +0800) - Re: XPA_nix - “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>