From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 1996 02:25:00 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IP: - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc
Message-ID: <199610200950.CAA15117@dfw-ix5.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 04:45 PM 10/18/96 -0700, John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com> wrote:
>Note that this attack requires physical access to the DES chip, to
>stress it so it will fail.  It works great against "tamper-proof"
>devices such as smart cards.  It doesn't work against encryption
>happening at any distance from the attacker (e.g. across the network).

It's probably most useful for defeating attempts to force smart cards
on the public as the government's solution to Key Recovery 
(e.g. Clipper 4 fails, so after the election they come out with Clipper 5
or the Anti-Terrorism Airplane Traveller's License Smartcard.)

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts@ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk
  Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_,
  and the politicians had to count them all.