1996-10-15 - Cynthia Dwork talk: Non-Malleable Cryptography

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From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
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Message ID: <199610150513.WAA00757@netcom6.netcom.com>
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UTC Datetime: 1996-10-15 05:13:34 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 14 Oct 1996 22:13:34 -0700 (PDT)

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From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 1996 22:13:34 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cynthia Dwork talk: Non-Malleable Cryptography
Message-ID: <199610150513.WAA00757@netcom6.netcom.com>
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Sorry for the late post.  I'm way behind in reading my mail.

Bill
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Date: Mon, 14 Oct 1996 09:27:14 -0700
From: "Francois V. Guimbretiere" <francois@cs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: Cynthia Dwork talk: Non-Malleable Cryptography
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Title: Non-Malleable Cryptography
 Speaker: Cynthia Dwork, IBM Almaden Research Center
    Time: Tuesday 15 Oct 1996, 4:15pm, Gates 104

ABSTRACT:
The notion of {\it non-malleable} cryptography,
an extension of semantically secure cryptography,
will be defined.
Informally, in the context of encryption
the additional requirement is that
given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate
a {\it different} ciphertext so that the respective
plaintexts are related.
Common public key cryptosystems are quite malleable:
for example, in RSA it is trivial to compute
$E(2x)$ given only $E(x)$.
Although defined with public key cryptography in mind,
non-malleability issues also arise in private-key cryptography.
Indeed, the security of
many common protocols, such as Kerberos, relies
implicitly on the inability of an adversary to compute $E(f(N))$
given only $E(N)$, for simple functions $f$.
The talk will focus on non-malleable public key cryptosystems.
with a few remarks on non-malleable schemes for
private-key cryptography, string commitment,
and proofs of possession of knowledge.

This is joint work with Danny Dolev and Moni Naor.
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