From: Asgaard <asgaard@Cor.sos.sll.se>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 823f127a1564c4040f2384b7d07cd70dd35b4ae81eddeafa496a19a329c8f6dc
Message ID: <Pine.HPP.3.91.961004181024.13299A-100000@cor.sos.sll.se>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-04 21:27:02 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 5 Oct 1996 05:27:02 +0800
From: Asgaard <asgaard@Cor.sos.sll.se>
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 1996 05:27:02 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secret Swedish GAK and ITAR
Message-ID: <Pine.HPP.3.91.961004181024.13299A-100000@cor.sos.sll.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Gunnar Klein, a Swedish MD, is chairing a EU committee dealing
with standardization of security measures in medical information
systems. Recently, in a full-page anti-GAK debating article in a
national Swedish evening newspaper (Aftonbladet 9/25/96), he
chose to reveal some secret information he's gotten hold of:
Sweden's representatives in the OECD GAK proceedings have declared
that Sweden is willing to sign bilateral or multilateral GAK
treaties, if other countries so demand. This declaration, along
with the OECD records per se, has been classified.
He also discloses that Sweden in late 1994, effectively in total
secrecy, issued a completely new law against export of 'stretegic
products', principally including all cryptography, without
permission from the 'Inspection for Strategic Products'. In theory
this law would cover export of a crypto program on a notebook.
Gunnar Klein suspects US strong-arming behind all this.
Obviously, Denmark has taken a different, anti-GAK, position in the
OECD proceedings. Denmark is less susceptible to US blackmail than
Sweden - they don't build fighter-planes with lots of US high tech
parts inside (like the JAS/Gripen).
Asgaard
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