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Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1996-10-16 - Re: extortion via digital cash

Header Data

From: iang@cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 88eb41decfd9c7810ea28b28aa19e37d193dac69d1cc3f84741daa380fe734ef
Message ID: <541ug5$egc@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>
Reply To: <96Oct15.114214edt.15378-2@gateway.aca.ca>
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-16 06:14:51 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 23:14:51 -0700 (PDT)

Raw message

From: iang@cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 23:14:51 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: extortion via digital cash
In-Reply-To: <96Oct15.114214edt.15378-2@gateway.aca.ca>
Message-ID: <541ug5$egc@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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In article <9610151846.AA00586@ch1d157nwk>,
Andrew Loewenstern  <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com> wrote:
>Some of the cut-n-choose protocols for after-the-fact catching of double  
>spenders would prevent this from happening.  Because the proto-coins from the  
>extortionist are blinded and the extortionee can't remove the blinding, it  
>would be impossible for the extortionee to properly complete the protocol with 
>the bank and pay-off the extortionist.

If you had Pipenet, or some other real-time anonymous communication system,
the extortionee could still carry out the cut-and-choose protocol by passing
the bank's requests for unblinding back to the extortionist.

   - Ian

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