1996-10-25 - Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?

Header Data

From: field@nyc.pipeline.com (Richard L. Field)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9bd507ac8e9863f0a3c311b23cd248056d966177a41ea84189b0d8b3682a6384
Message ID: <199610250325.DAA22372@pipe1.ny3.usa.pipeline.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-25 03:26:26 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 20:26:26 -0700 (PDT)

Raw message

From: field@nyc.pipeline.com (Richard L. Field)
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 20:26:26 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
Message-ID: <199610250325.DAA22372@pipe1.ny3.usa.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  The 18 June 1996 report, "How to Make a Mint:  The Cryptography of
Anonymous Electronic Cash", was written by Laurie Law, Susan Sabett, and
Jerry Solinas of the Office of Information Security Research and
Technology, Cryptology Division, NSA.  It is 30 pages, as follows: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 1.  What is Electronic Cash? 
  1.1  Electronic Payment 
  1.2  Security of Electronic Payments 
  1.3  Electronic Cash 
  1.4  Multiple Spending 
 
Section 2.  A Cryptographic Description 
  2.1  Public-Key Cryptographic Tools 
        (One-Way Functions, Key Pairs, Signature and Identification, Secure
Hashing) 
  2.2  A Simplified Electronic Cash Protocol 
  2.3  Untraceable Electronic Payments 
  2.4  A Basic Electronic Cash Protocol 
 
Section 3.  Proposed Off-Line Implementations 
  3.1  Including Identifying Information 
        (Cut and Choose, Zero-Knowledge Proofs) 
  3.2  Authentication and Signature Techniques 
        (RSA Signatures, Blind RSA Signatures, The Schnorr Algorithms, 
         Schnorr identification, Schnorr Signature, Blind Schnorr
Signature, 
         Chaum-Pederson Signature, Implementations of the Schnorr
Protocols) 
  3.3  Summary of Proposed Implementations 
        (Chaum-Fiat-Naor, Brands, Ferguson) 
 
Section 4.  Optional Features of Off-Line Cash 
  4.1  Transferability 
  4.2  Divisibility 
 
Section 5.  Security Issues 
  5.1  Multiple Spending Prevention 
  5.2  Wallet Observers 
  5.3  Security Failures 
        (Types of failures, Consequences of a failure) 
  5.4  Restoring Traceability 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
   - Richard Field 
 
 
 
 
On Oct 24, 1996 09:52:25, 'declan@well.com (Declan McCullagh)' wrote: 
 
>Just got off the phone with the NSA. 
> 
>"There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology 
>we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you 
>back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released 
>or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did 
>you read about it on the Internet?" 
> 
>-Declan 
 
>>______________________________ Forward Header 
 
>>21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 
>>October 17, 1996 
>> 
>>National Security Agency Report Raises 
>>Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money 
>> 
>> 
>>     A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National 
>>Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology 
>>discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash 
>>systems and their likely consequences.  While demonstrating concern over
the 
>>attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out
methods 
>>that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including 
>>limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise,

>>requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of 
>>transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to
restore 
>>traceability under certain circumstances.  The report contains an
excellent 
>>summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash 
>>protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security 
>>issues. 





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