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1996-10-18 - Re: DES cracker.

Header Data

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
To: “Geoffrey C. Grabow” <gcg@pb.net>
Message Hash: 9d935d2fdc2aeab9cf4ba0d56e6315b922badcae010c3ac2745389af7ee966fa
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9610172224.A7082-0100000@netcom9>
Reply To: <3.0b36.32.19961018003632.00699af0@mail.pb.net>
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-18 05:38:32 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 17 Oct 1996 22:38:32 -0700 (PDT)

Raw message

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 1996 22:38:32 -0700 (PDT)
To: "Geoffrey C. Grabow" <gcg@pb.net>
Subject: Re: DES cracker.
In-Reply-To: <3.0b36.32.19961018003632.00699af0@mail.pb.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9610172224.A7082-0100000@netcom9>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Fri, 18 Oct 1996, Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote:
> Tell me what you need.  A large part of my job is providing hardware
> security modules to banks to secure (among other things) their ATM networks
> (Automated Teller MAchines, not Async Transfer Mode).  Do you need PIN
> encryption formats, transmission message protocols, or what?  Just LMK.

It would be best to attack something that has broader use than just a 
single pin. At best, that would allow an hostile to clean out a single 
account. A target that would allow one to attack, say an account held 
*by* a bank would be more attractive.

--Lucky

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