From: Matt Blaze <mab@research.att.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 22:09:17 -0700 (PDT)
To: adam@homeport.org
Subject: Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
Message-ID: <199610240505.BAA01813@nsa.research.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here were my thoughts on the subject when this was mentioned to me
a month and a half ago.

-matt

[by the way, please note that I don't read cypherpunks, so please include
me in any reply that you want me to see.  Thanks.]


------- Forwarded Message

To: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
cc: peter.allan@aeat.co.uk, cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol... 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 06 Sep 1996 14:22:23 BST."
             <199609061322.OAA01150@server.test.net> 
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 1996 18:50:00 -0400
From: Matt Blaze <mab@nsa.research.att.com>

Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:
>
>Peter Allan <peter.allan@aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks:
>> In the talk about replyable nym-mailers I haven't
>> yet seen netescrow mentioned.
>> 
>> You DID all read this ?
>> 
>> [Matt Blazes  Oblivious Key Escrow paper]
>>
>> This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining
>> the conditions under which they release their shares.  
>> This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer).
>> 
>> Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in
>> netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing.  The problem
>> of operator coercion is not addressed by this.
>
>Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet
>style system with the database held in `netescrow'.
>
>The remailer in normal operation has access to the database by making
>requests satisfying the conditions of the secret share holders.
>
>When the remailer is compromised the memory resident key is lost when
>the machine is switched off, and the owner refuses to release the key.
>
>Is what you are proposing?
>
>It sounds like a cross between Matt's netescrow and Ross Anderson's
>eternity file system.  Your penet database is being stored in a
>distributed file system, with shares, and the identity of the share
>holders is concealed.  However the aim is not to prevent others
>censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second
>avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'.
>
>This changes the system over storing the database encrypted on the
>remailer machines own disk in these ways:

[well-thought-out stuff deleted]
This is the first I've seen this proposal to use Oblivious Key Escrow
(OKE) as a store for a remailer database; apologies if all this has
been discussed already (I don't ready cypherpunks very often these
days).
     
My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term,
slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point
of failure for either security or availability.  The remailer model is
a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular
because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this
application.  But let me think ``out loud.''

Suppose we want to build a persistent-reply address anonymous
messaging service (like the late anon.penet.fi) with the following
properties:

        a) The database that maps anonymous addresses to real
           addresses is secure against erasure or other permanent loss
           of availability
        b) The database is also secure against accidental or coerced
           disclosure.

Requirement (a) implies backups and persistent storage.  Requirement
(b) implies that both access to both operational and backup copies
must be carefully controlled, preferably by technical means.  So far,
this looks like a good candidate for distributed security, in the
style of OKE, Mike Reiter's Rampart service, or Ross Anderson's
Eternity service.

Actually, I think the best solution would be for the remailer itself
to be a distributed process, split among enough places to make it
difficult for anyone to attack enough nodes to compromise or recover
the address translation database.  It is not at all obvious how to do
this in practice, however, since any solution would need to combine
secure distributed computation (to calculate the mapping for each
message sent without revealing to any party, including the sender,
what the mapping is) with anonymous networking techniques such as
mixes to prevent traffic analysis from revealing the mapping.  There
are a number of unsolved theoretical and practical problems here, and
I think working out the details of such a system would make for a good
PhD thesis or two (quite seriously, and I'd be interested in talking
with anyone who wanted to pursue such a line of research).

So for now let's limit ourselves to existing tools and techniques, or
at least tools and techniques that are close to existing.  Let's say,
for the moment, that we wanted to base the system on OKE.

Assume an unconditionally trusted remailer operator whose goal is to
construct a system that resists attempts to force him or her to
UNILATERALLY reveal the database.  That is, it should not be possible
to force the remailer operator to reveal the database contents without
also enlisting the aid of the (collectively anonymous) oblivious key
holders.  My (not carefully considered) first thought is that the
address database would be encrypted and stored locally, using a key
that is escrowed using OKE.  The key would never be locally stored;
preferably, the key would exist only in memory.  The operating system
on which the remailer is run would delete this key ``at the drop of a
hat,'' e.g., any time the system was rebooted, any time someone logs
in, any time unusual activity of any sort is detected.  The key
release policy is controlled by a public key, for which the secret key
is stored in a more persistent manner (e.g., in the file system).  
Whenever the database key is deleted, the OKE recovery process is used
to recover the key automatically, and the database is re-encrypted
with a new key that is distributed to a new set of shareholders.
Under normal operation, this might happen once a month or so, and
might entail (because of policy-based delays and the time required to
collect shares) a few days of downtime.

Under unusual conditions that might precipitate some kind of coercive
situation, the remailer operator (or some automatic process on the
remailer machine) would delete the signing key as well as the
database.  It might be reasonable, for example, to delete this file
any time someone logs in to the remailer machine (which shouldn't be
needed ordinarily).  The OKE share policy would require that the
shareholder operator examine unsigned key requests manually before
releasing them.  If the keys were deleted because of a false alarm or
machine failure, the remailer operator would send a message saying
something to the effect of ``Hey, I blew it.  Please send me the key
shares once you're convinced no one has a gun to my head.''  In the
event of a public safety emergency, the police are free to attempt to
issue their own appeal for key shares, but the ability to for them to
do this is not a design goal, but rather a side-effect of the design.

I see a number of problems with using OKE for this.  In particular,
key recovery is moderately expensive and key distribution with the
oblivious multicast protocol in my paper can be very expensive.  If
keys are deleted regularly, the downtime could be unacceptable.  I'm
not sure OKE is entirely workable for this application, but perhaps a
more clever design could prove me wrong.

There are a whole bunch of engineering issues here, particularly
related to automatically detecting ``unusual'' situations.

So can this scheme be improved upon?  Is there a better way to run a
persistent-reply-address remailer?  These are interesting, and I think
largely open, questions.

- -matt

NB  The oblivious key escrow paper that I presented at the Information Hiding
workshop at the Isaac Newton Institute in May, is available at:
        ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps



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