From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 04:20:07 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GAK Naive or Shrewd?
Message-ID: <1.5.4.16.19961015111823.2a6f2372@pop.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Ern Hua's letter is ultimate.

     -----

     The New York Times, October 15, 1996.


     Is Clinton's Encryption Policy Naive or Shrewd?


     To the Editor:

     There is something strange going on with the Clinton
     Administration's policy on data-scrambling software and
     Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor's defense of it
     (letter, Oct. 11).

     If the Administration really wanted to prevent encryption
     software from falling into hostile hands, it would try to
     pass a law limiting the type of encryption that can be
     sold domestically, not just exported.

     The cumbersome system the Administration proposes may be
     a measure of its computer naivete. People who are
     familiar with computer encryption know that strong
     encryption can be readily had here in the United States
     over the Internet or telephone lines from dial-up
     computer bulletin boards.

     Not long ago I downloaded a copy "Pretty Good Privacy," a
     system similar to the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman "strong"
     public-key method. Anyone with a computer, a modem and a
     phone line could do the same.

     Or the Government may not be naive at all but merely
     Machiavelian. Suppose the code breakers at the National
     Security Agency had managed to develop efficient
     solutions to "strong" methods. Would it be in the
     Government's interest to keep that fact a secret and to
     create a distracting furor by pushing another, weaker
     (and exportable) encryption system it knows has not a
     chance being adopted? Then encryption usrs would be
     lulled into using compromised systems while the National
     Security Agency decrypts their mail.

     Warren Wetmore,Hazel Crest, Ill., Oct. 11,1996

     -----

     To the Editor:

     Mickey Kantor's Oct. 11 letter is unconvincing. Instead
     of trying to prohibit strong cryptography, governments
     should encourage its use. It is the best tool for
     defending our privacy on the information highway.

     Jeffrey Shallit, Kitchener, Canada, Oct. 11,1996
     The writer is an associate professor of computer science
     at the University of Waterloo.

     -----

     To the Editor:

     Mickey Kantor (letter, Oct. 11) says that your Oct. 4
     editorial ignores the trend -- especially in Europe -- to
     require use of key-recovery products and bar the import
     of stronger encryption products. This ignores that no one
     wants mandated key recovery. Some important uses of
     encryption, like secure telephone conversations, do not
     need key recovery for any reason other than law
     enforcement intercepts.

     Mr. Kantor's point on other nations' barring imports is
     absurd. Since when do we tailor our export limits to the
     import limits of other nations?

     The "trend" Mr. Kantor refers to is artificially created
     by the United States through lobbying efforts. Mr. Kantor
     uses the word "trend" as if other nations were
     independently pursuing the key-recovery path, when, in
     fact, only a few are considering such a move. Some, like
     Japan, have opposed such a direction. Others, like
     Sweden, have considered such a move secretly because such
     a policy cannot withstand democratic scrutiny.

     Mr. Kantor's letter is a blatant attempt by the
     Administration to get what it wants for law enforcement
     and national security agencies without any concern for
     the nature of the technology or the economic effect of
     such policies.

     Ernest Hua, Sunnyvale, Calif., Oct. 11, 1996
     The writer is a software engineer.

     -----