From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@got.net>
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 1996 05:26:31 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: yellow journalism and Encryption
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Vinnie may think this is "asswipe journalism," but I think it's one of the
more interesting and revealing articles we've seen. In fact, it's a pretty
good summary of the history of wiretaps, the tension between privacy and
surveillance, and the thinking of those pushing for GAK/Key Recovery.


At 11:12 PM -0700 10/7/96, Vinnie Moscaritolo wrote:

>http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/examiner/article.cgi?year=1996&month=10&day=06&ar
>t
>Encryption controversy pits life against liberty
>TOM ABATE
>EXAMINER COLUMNIST
...
>"Wiretapping is the main issue," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel
>of the National Security Agency, the CIA's code-breaking and eavesdroping
>cousin.


Notice what this means. It means the longterm goal of "Key Recovery" is for
*domestic* use as well, as this is where the vast number of wiretaps in
criminal cases occurs.

We all knew this, of course, but it's useful to see Stewart Baker
explicitly conceding the point. He did not say: "Exports of critical
technology to other countries is the main issue." He said: "Wiretapping is
the main issue."

While no doubt many of the "criminals" the Feds wish to wiretap are
communicating offshore and hence _might_ be using GAK (I emphasize
"might"), clearly a large fraction of the crimes the Feds wish to track are
almost wholly domestic. The John Gottis of the world talking to their
compadres, the militias planning bombings, the child pornography ring,
whatever. The Unabomber. Most are domestic. The U.S. is a big country. As
Baker points out, "Wiretapping is the main issue."



>"If two criminals are discussing a plot over the telephone and we have a
>wiretap order, the encryption would negate the wiretap," said Michael
>Vatis, a senior Department of Justice official.

And _export_ controls on crypto would affect this how?

>The same would happen if investigators seized the computerized bookkeeping
>records of a drug-smuggling ring only to find they were saved in an
>unbreakable code. But as frustrating as it might be to seize a mound of
>indecipherable evidence, it was the prospect of losing the wiretap that got
>Vatis most aroused.

And _export_ controls on crypto would affect this how?

>Having access to a spare set of code-breaking keys "is not a shift in the
>balance of power," Vatis said. "It's preserving
>the status quo."

Clearly these folks are talking as if GAK/Key Recovery is mandated for
_domestic_ communications.

(I think we'll be seeing some mighty interesting documents and discussions
coming out as FOIAs are filed. Just as the FOIAs a few years ago showed the
true thinking behind Clipper: the eventual outlawing of non-Clipper
alternatives.)



"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."