From: Chang You Shim <cyshim@asiaonline.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 08:52:53 -0800 (PST)
To: list <list@infowar.com>
Subject: Re: infowar Digest for 10 Nov 1996
In-Reply-To: <199611110511.VAA01029@toad.com>
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Please put me off from the list.





On Mon, 11 Nov 1996, list wrote:

>                        infowar Digest for 10 Nov 1996
>
> Topics covered in this issue include:
>
>    1: RE: Chemical Warfare Agents
>              by alm@io-online.com
>    2: Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine
>              by winn@infowar.com
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1                                Message:0001                            1
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To: infowar@infowar.com
> From: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty@infowar.com>
> Subject: Infowar Digest  Vol. 1  # 1
>
>
> infowar@infowar.com
>
>                      Sunday, November 10 1996    Volume 01: Number 01
>
>                                        We thank our sponsors:
>
> National Computer Security Association
> OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Inc.
> New Dimensions International - Security Training
> Secure Computing Corporation
> HOMECOM Communications
> Internet Security Solutions
> ___________________________________________________________
>
> Infowar@infowar.com is brought to you in the  the interest of an open,
> unclassified exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement of
> Information Warfare related issues.   Topics of discussion for this list
> include:  Infowar, Electronic Civil Defense, Hacking, Defensive Techniques,
> Policy, Non-Lethals, Psyops, Chemical Warfare Agents and WMD.
>
> As the list expands we will adapt to the needs and desires of our subscribers.
>
> This is a DIGEST format.
> ________________________________________________________________
>
> Contents of this Digest:               Volume 01: Number 01
>
> Infowar@infowar.com   Chemical Warfare Agents
> Infowar@infowar.com   Iraq   WMD
> Infowar@infowar.com   RE: Chemical Warfare Agents
>
> ----------------------------------------------
>
> To:        Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA  GWilson@osd.pentagon.mil
> Cc:         betty@infowar.com
> Subject:  Re: Chemical Warfare Agents
>
> Chemical Warfare Agents
> An overview of chemicals defined as chemical weapons
>
> >> Main Groups
> >>
> >>     Nerve Agents
> >>     Mustard Agents
> >>     Hydrogen Cyanide
> >>     Tear Gases
> >>     Arsines
> >>     Psychotomimetic Agents
> >>     Toxins
> >>     Potential CW Agents
> >>
> What is a Chemical Warfare Agent?
>
> A United Nations report from 1969 defines chemical warfare agents as " ...
> chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be
> employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants
> ... ".
> The Chemical Weapons Convention defines chemical weapons as including not
> only toxic chemicals but also ammunition and equipment for their
> dispersal.  Toxic chemicals are stated to be " ... any chemical which,
> through its
> chemical effect on living processes, may cause death, temporary loss of
> performance, or permanent injury to people and animals". Plants are not
> mentioned in this context.
>
> Toxins, i.e., poisons produced by living organisms and their synthetic
> equivalents, are classed as chemical warfare agents if they are used for
> military purposes. However, they have a special position since they are
> covered by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. This
> convention bans the development,production and stockpiling of such
> substances not required for peaceful purposes.
>
> Today, thousands of poisonous substances are known but only a few are
> considered suitable for chemical warfare. About 70 different chemicals
> have been used or stockpiled as CW agents during the 20th century. Today, only
> a few of these are considered of interest owing to a number of demands that
> must be placed on a substance if it is to be of use as a CW agent.
>
> A presumptive agent must not only be highly toxic but also "suitably
> highly toxic" so that it is not too difficult to handle. The substance
> must be capable of being stored for long periods in containers without
> degradation and without corroding the packaging material. It must be
> relatively resistant to atmospheric water and oxygen so that it does not
> lose effect when dispersed. It must also withstand the heat developed when
> dispersed.
> >>
> "War Gases" are Seldom Gases
> >>
> CW agents are frequently called war gases and a war where CW agents are
> used is usually called a gas war. These incorrect terms are a result of
> history. During the First World War use was made of chlorine and phosgene
> which are gases at room temperature and normal atmospheric pressure. The
> CWagents used today are only exceptionally gases. Normally they are liquids
> or solids. However, a certain amount of the substance is always in
> volatile form (the amount depending on how rapidly the substance evaporates)
> and the gas concentration may become poisonous. Both solid substances and
> liquids can also be dispersed in the air in atomized form, so-called
> aerosols. An aerosol can penetrate the body through the respiratory organs
> in the same way as a gas. Some CW agents can also penetrate the skin. This
> mainly concerns liquids but in some cases also gases and aerosols. Solid
> substances penetrate the skin slowly unless
> they happen to be mixed with a suitable solvent.
>
> Effects on Vegetation
>
> Flowers and leaves of some plants may change colour if they are exposed to
> droplets of a CW agent in an attack. Light or matt spots may occur as well
> as brown discoloration, particularly on leaves. Entire trees, or parts of
> them, may also get brown discoloration in situations of strong exposure.
> The discoloration often arises within a few minutes but may also occur
> after some days.
>
> Classification
>
> CW agents can be classified in many different ways. There are, for
> example, volatile substances, which mainly contaminate the air, or persistent
> substances, which are involatile and therefore mainly cover surfaces.
> CW agents mainly used against people may also be divided into lethal and
> incapacitating cathegories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if
> less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through
> nausea or visual problems. The limit between lethal and incapacitating
> substances is not absolute but refers to a statistical average. In
> comparison, it may be mentioned that the ratio for the nerve agents
> between the incapacitating and lethal dose is approximately 1/10. Chemical
> warfare agents are generally also classified according to their effect on the
> organism.
>
> In order to achieve good ground coverage when dispersed from a high
> altitude with persistent CW agents the dispersed droplets must be
> sufficiently large to ensure that they fall within the target area and do
> not get transported elsewhere by the wind. This can be achieved by
> dissolving polymers (e.g., polystyrene or rubber products) in the CW agent
> to make the product highly-viscous or thickened. The result will be that
> the persistence time and adhesive ability increase which thus complicates
> decontamination.
>
> Although it may appear that a CW agent can be "custom-made" for a certain
> purpose, this is not the case. Instead, there is always some uncertainty
> about the persistence time, the dispersal and the effect.
>
> These Military Chemicals are Not Considered to be Chemical Weapons
>
> Incendiary agents such as napalm and phosphorus are not considered to be
> CW agents since they achieve their effect mainly through thermal energy.
> Certain types of smoke screen may be poisonous in extremely high
> concentrations but, nonetheless, smoke ammunition is not classed as a
> chemical weapon since the poisonous effect is not the reason for their
> use. Plants, microorganisms, algae, etc. which produce toxins are not classed
> as chemical weapons even if the produced toxins belong to that class.
> Pathogenic microorganisms, mainly viruses and bacteria, are classed as
> biological weapons.
>
> --------------------------------------
>
> From:   "Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA" <GWilson@osd.pentagon.mil>
> Subject:  Iraq: WMD
> Date:      Fri, 1 Nov 1996 08:24:37 -0500
>
>    WASHINGTON (AP) -- Before and during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, truck
> convoys carried Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear
> material to safe haven in Iran, according to U.S. intelligence documents.
> >   "The trucks were camouflaged with mud during their travel through Iraqi
> >territory," said the report placed Thursday on the Internet. "The convoy moved
> >only at night. The mud was washed off after re-entry into Iranian territory."
> >   The report said "at least 14 trucks were identified as having nuclear,
> >biological and chemical cargo. Boxes labeled 'tularemia,' 'anthrax,'
> 'botulinum' and 'plague' were loaded into containers."
> >   The trucks were driven by Iranian civilians who turned them over to Iranian
> >Revolutionary Guards.
> >   That account was among more than 200 documents placed on the Internet over
> >the objections of the CIA. They were put on the worldwide computer network by
> >publisher Bruce W. Kletz, who plans to put out a book by a former CIA analyst,
> >Patrick Eddington.
> >   Eddington asserts that the agency has hidden evidence that American troops
> >were exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons.
> >   "These documents are still under review," CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said.
> >"We consider portions of them to be classified."
> >   The Pentagon originally put the material on the Internet and then
> withdrew it in February when the CIA objected to making it public.
> >   While numerous studies have found no conclusive evidence that Iraqi forces
> >used chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops during the 1991 war, it
> >is feared U.S. forces could have been exposed to nerve gas as they destroyed an
> >Iraqi munitions dump after the war's end.
> >   Iraq's transfer of material to Iran was a new example of cooperation between
> >two countries that fought an eight-year war but became covert allies when a
> >U.S.-led coalition demanded that Iraq withdraw forces that occupied Kuwait in
> >August 1990.
> >   During the ensuing Persian Gulf War, Iran allowed Iraqi planes to land
> on its territory to escape destruction by coalition forces. The planes were not
> allowed to rejoin the Iraqi military during the conflict.
> >   The documents did not shed new light on whether U.S. forces came into
> contact with Iraqi chemical weapons. But they did show the concern about Iraq's ability to manufacture and deploy such weapons.
> >   One document cited a defector's account that "at least one chemical company
> >is attached to each (Iraqi) division."
> >   Russia may have supplied biological warfare technology to Iraq and North
> >Korea, according to a report written in 1994. "It was believed that the
> >technology transfer commenced several years prior to April 1992 and was
> still in progress during April 1992," the report said.
> >   The material also indicated the government had evidence that Iraq had moved
> >chemical weapons into Kuwait.
> >   One report in January 1991, from an Iraqi national, said that chemical land
> >mines had been loaded for shipment to Kuwait. The report said the information
> >"cannot be confirmed."
> >   In September 1990, less than two months after Iraq occupied Kuwait, evidence
> >was seen that "Iraqi forces may be conducting chemical decontamination
> >exercises. They could be preparing for a chemical attack."
> >   During the same period, when the United States and its allies were massing
> >forces in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. officials were concerned that
> terrorists
> >allied with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would stage attacks on allied
> forces.
> >
> >   Among the records returned to the Internet is a Nov. 3, 1995, memo
> written by Paul Wallner, a Pentagon official heading an oversight panel dealing with Gulf War veterans' illnesses.
> >   Noting that various military officials and departments had "expressed
> concern about potential sensitive reports or documents on GulflINK," the Persian Gulf War web site, Wallner recommended certain steps to "allow the investigation
> team time to begin preparation of a response on particular 'bombshell' reports."
> >   According to the memo, a host of material would be subject to further
> review, including "documents containing releasable information which could
> embarrass the government or DoD," the Department of Defense.
> >   It also warned that additional scrutiny would be needed on documents "that
> >could generate unusual public/media attention" or those "which seem to confirm
> >the use or detection of nuclear, chemical or biological agents."
>
> -------------------------------------------------------
> Notes from Moderator:
>
> 1. GulfLINK documents can now be downloaded from infowar.com
>
> 2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN TERRORISM
> The Emerging Threat Posed by Non-State Proliferation, James K. Campbell is an interesting read.  The article is posted on infowar.com under the What's New section.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> ate: Tue, 29 Oct 1996 12:22:27 -0700
> To: winn@Infowar.Com
> From: alm@io-online.com
> Subject: RE: Chemical Warfare Agents
> Cc: "Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA" <GWilson@osd.pentagon.mil>,
>  betty@infowar.com, 'Ron Lewis' <INTELLIGYST@worldnet.att.net>
>
> I think we have an excellent example of the psychological impact of
> chemical weapons in the case of Israel right now.  The news statements
> about land for peace in the Golan came shortly after new gas masks were
> issued in Israel and I got curious.  I went back and checked the news
> database and found that speeches recomending not serving in the IDF, that
> students should leave Israel, and a wide variety of other self defeating
> actions peaked at about one week after news of chemical weapons threats,
> issueing of gas masks, and other news of this type appeared in the papers
> there.  This comes after a long period of stress and being on high alert.
> Early reactions seem to be panic, after a period of such stress it seems
> make people (at least in this situation) turn in on themselves, willing to
> abandon strongly held beliefs, etc. without knowingly tieing it to the
> threats.  The attacks seemed aimed not at the threats but at the government
> of Israel; yet, they are tied time-wise to increased pressure.  This was
> traced over a two year period which gives some validity rather than a
> one-time relationship.
>
> I hate to say it, but this is an excellent laboratory for a variety of such
> studies as it isn't artificial and its one of the few places where open
> information is available on on-going threats of various types.
> Sociologists have already done studies on behavior in society and such
> using this lab.
>
> Alijandra
> ------------------------------------------------------
>
> END
>
> Infowar             Sunday, November 10 1996        Volume 01: Number 01
>
>
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>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 2                                Message:0002                            2
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To: infowar@infowar.com
> From: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty@infowar.com>
> Subject: Infowar Digest  Vol. 1  #2
>
>
> infowar@infowar.com=20
>
>              Sunday, November 10  1996  Volume 01: Number 02
>
>                                We thank our sponsors:
>
> National Computer Security Association
> OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS
> New Dimensions International - Security Training
> Secure Computing Corporation
> HOMECOM Communications
> Internet Security Solutions
> __________________________________________________
> Infowar@infowar.com is brought to you in the  the interest of an open,=
>  unclassified exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement=
>  of Information Warfare related issues.   Topics of discussion for this list=
>  include:  Infowar, Electronic Civil Defense, Hacking, Defensive Techniques,=
>  Policy, Non-Lethals, Psyops, Chemical Warfare Agents and WMD.=20
>
> As the list expands we will adapt to the needs and desires of our=
>  subscribers.=20
>
> This is a DIGEST format.
> __________________________________________________________
>
> Contents  Vol. #1  No.2
>
> infowar   Original Allegations - Flt 800 Disaster
> infowar   Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine
> infowar   Electronic Civil Defense
>
> -------------------------------------------
> To: winn@Infowar.Com
> Date: 8 Nov 1996 14:33:38 CST
> Subject: Original Allegations - Flt. 800 Disaster
>
> ENN Special Report
> 11/08/96 - 13:45CST
>
> Original Allegations of Friendly Fire Came From Alleged Iranian
> Propagandist
>
> (ENN) In light of yesterday's statements by former JFK Press Secretary
> Pierre Sallinger, the Emergency Response & Research Institute conducted
> an internal literature review of documents regarding the TWA Flight 800
> disaster.  This internal probe included e-mail, newsgroup postings,press=
>  reports, and consultations with experts, received from numerous sources. =
>  It revealed that the original allegations of a U.S. Naval "friendly fire=
>  incident" came from an alleged Iranian/Extremist Moslem propagandist named=
>  Parveez Syad, aka Parveez Hussein, who was operating from a base in=
>  Birmingham, England at the time.  Interestingly, Mr.Hussein/Syad=
>  distributed these allegations widely on the Internet within 48 hours of the=
>  incident and made what appeared to be premature accusations that the United=
>  States was already engaged in a "cover-up."
>
> Mr. Hussein/Syad's current whereabouts are unknown, and it is believed
> that he may have been the subject of a government investigation in
> England. Concerns were raised, at the time, by ERRI analysts that Mr.
> Syad/Hussein may have been engaged in an "disinformation" campaign in an=
>  effort to deflect attention from possible moslem extremist involvement
> in the bombing of Flt. 800. Subsequent inquiries and examinations by
> ERRI seem to verify that there was a concerted "foreign" effort to obscure=
>  and confuse a number of issues involved in the Flt. 800 investigation.
>
> Speculation continues among experts in regard to the authenticity of the
> alleged U.S. government documents that are reportedly in the possession
> of Mr. Sallinger. Without examination of these documents, ERRI analysts
> say that further confirmation of Mr. Sallinger's statement is difficult
> at best. One purposefully unidentified consultant told ENN that it is
> even possible that Mr. Sallinger and French intelligence agents may have
> been "duped" by a "foreign effort."
>
> U.S. Navy and FBI officials have both "catagorically denied" any viable
> evidence of a "friendly fire" incident or of any sort of "cover-up" on
> the part of the U.S. government. James Kallstrom announced today that he
> would welcome any additional information or evidence that Mr. Sallinger
> or others might have in regard to the Flight #800 tragedy.
>
> EmergencyNet News Service (ENN)
> Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI)
> 6348 N. Milwaukee Ave., #312
> Chicago, IL. 60646
> (773) 631-3774 - Voice
> (773) 631-4703 - Fax
> (773) 631-3467 - Modem/Emergency BBS On-Line
> -------------------------------------
>
> Date: Fri, 8 Nov 96 16:26 EST
> From: Michael Wilson <0005514706@mcimail.com>
> To: G-TWO List Members <g-two@majordomo.netcom.com>
> Subject: Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine
>
> Many of you may be dealing with questions regarding the two matters, so
> I thought I would make this available to you.
>
> ---
> Two recent events in the media are prompting my writing a very brief=
>  commentary:
> allegations of a cover-up in the TWA Flight 800 disaster and the alleged=20
> CIA-Cocaine connection into the L.A. urban environment. My comments will be=
>  directed at the propaganda value of these media events, as I'm currently=
>  engaged in writing a primer on propaganda, and these make interesting case=
>  studies.
>
> Modern propaganda comes in many forms, but of primary concern in these two=
>  cases are:
> - 'Mobile truth,' or the reinterpretation of events (revisionist history), a=
> =20
> common feature on the Internet, which is increasingly becoming an entry=
>  point into the more conventional media;
> - Psyops in support of operations, including spin control, after action=
>  reports,or informative accounts when the media is controlled by=
>  intelligence and law enforcement;
> - The digital nature of media--text, photographs, video, audio--has=
>  undermined the ability to establish the reality of what they represent as=
>  observational proxies. This has recently been termed the 'fictive=
>  environment' by the military, and I'll use the term for lack a better one.
>
> Let me discuss the two cases in terms of these points:
>
> TWA 800
> Ever since Flt. 800 went down, the conspiracy theorists have been out on the=
>  Internet, alleging everything from a Syrian missile to a 'friendly fire'=20
> accident. Part of these allegations have been blind assertions, but some=
>  have=20
> been backed up with 'proof' that entails supposed photographs and internal=
> =20
> government documents.
>
> Mobile truth: in the absence of public facts or knowledge, speculation has=
>  run wild. As usual, everyone's favorite pet suspect emerges--terrorists,=
>  the U.S. Navy, government cover-ups, etc. This 'playing to the audience'=
>  has received wide audience and coverage, because it is media hot--it=
>  attracts a lot attention simply because it receives attention in the=
>  viewers, readers, etc. in a self-fulfilling way. It plays on public and=
>  hidden fears; provides simple=20
> solutions; gives an enemy to hate, react against; it justifies the beliefs=
>  and=20
> agenda of many. The only solution is to provide facts, hopefully answers; of=
> =20
> course, this is antithetical to the investigatory (scientific and criminal)=
> =20
> process. This vacuum of data is being capitalized on by individuals or=20
> organizations who know that the official channels are going to be closed to=
>  the public--their motive is something I have no desire to quantify.
>
> PsyOps: this game is lose-lose for everyone; the public is confused and=
>  angered, the investigation is hampered or discredited, the sources of the=
>  false information will eventually be shown to be wrong (although they will=
>  launch secondary operations to manage this as well, alleging further=
>  cover-up, conspiracy, and so forth). What happens though is a continual=
>  lessening of the resistance in the information environment to future psyops=
>  operations, and this is the long term benefit sought by the perpetrators.=
>  Confidence in the government is at an all time low--post Viet Nam,=
>  Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater, etc. The readiness to believe the worst=
>  becomes greater and greater, and public mental health suffers.
>
> Fictive environment: while ground truth comes from direct observation, we're=
>  becoming more dependent upon observational proxies than ever=
>  before--photos, audio, video, documents, etc. The memories of observers is=
>  a questionable thing at best (the madness of crowds), but digital trickery=
>  are removing the trust values that we, only a few years ago, were able to=
>  place in 'more reliable' materials. In the case of TWA, just as in most any=
>  case, the creation or faking of evidence requires only modest skills and a=
>  personal computer. Photos can be digital from their origin, and once=
>  transferred into a computer with the right software, they can be merged or=
>  altered in ways that are=20difficult to refute, even when false. Documents=
>  are trivial to manufacture; elements used for provenance, showing a truth=
>  and history of origin, can be falsified in a variety of ways (optically=
>  scanning letterhead or signature, creation from scratch by matching=
>  typeset, etc.), and the textual body can be anything imagined (and textual=
>  analysis or comparison is commonly beyond the capabilities of the=
>  audience). Video and audio are slightly more complex (in levels of effort);=
>  video modification, loosely based on the same technology used to alter=
>  photographs, requires greater skill and more powerful equipment, but is=
>  gradually coming into the range of the average consumer, just as audio=
>  sampling and modification technology has reached the 'garage' level. All=
>  this calls into question any materials of physical evidence, but those=
>  distributed over the Internet are particularly ntrustworthy--even the lower=
>  resolution of net-distribution works to the advantage of the creation of=
>  such materials. I expect this problem to have increasing impact as time=
>  goes on, including in criminal and civil cases (for instance, in the Yousef=
>  case in New York, where he claimed his computer files were faked, or the=
>  potential falsification of photographic evidence in the Simpson civil=
>  trial).
>
> In short, the discussion and materials on/using the Internet have done=
>  little to advance the search for the truth of the matter in TWA 800, and=
>  have done much harm (diverting critical manpower from the investigation,=
>  damaging the credibility of the investigation, etc.).
>
> CIA-Cocaine connection
> TWA and this accusation actually have much in common from a propaganda=
>  standpoint. The allegation (made by the San Jose Mercury News) was that=
>  assets associated with the CIA-backed effort in support of the Contras were=
>  trafficking in cocaine, which helped to finance the (c)overt war. In=
>  particular, the cocaine smuggled into the U.S.A. was supposed to have been=
>  converted into the 'crack' or rock (smokable) form, and introduced into the=
>  African-American urban setting in Los Angeles, with the undertones being=
>  that it was a conspiracy to undermine the solidarity of the A-A community.
>
> Mobile truth: the basic assertion never actually connected the CIA with any=
> =20
> involvement or trafficking, yet the implication (made indirectly or=
>  directly,=20
> depending on the source) was that it was a tacit CIA operation. Far be it=
>  for me to write the apologia for the Agency, but not only is the supposed=
>  action=20
> illegal and immoral, it is also highly unlikely. Creative interpretation of=
>  the=20
> events allowed a rather clever ontological judo--the all-powerful,=
>  all-knowing CIA either had to admit they had no idea what their assets were=
>  involved in (thus damaging the all-knowing aspect of their reputation);=
>  they could admit to knowledge but inaction (thus criminal facilitation, or=
>  having to say that sometimes they need the help of 'bad' people, not a=
>  politically correct position); or they could deny any involvement, and=
>  foster the continual suspicion of cover-up, conspiracy, and hidden agendas.=
>  Any way they move, they lose. This is again a position where history has=
>  created an impression that the Agency would perform the worst action in=
>  support of their own agenda,=20and then actively protect themselves from=
>  investigation; no amount of reform or whitewashing can reverse the trend.=
>  The strength of this attack on the credibility of the Agency is that it=
>  plays so well with public impressions of the Agency, appears to fit the=
>  profile of previous Agency violations of public trust, but can't be=
>  defended against because of the secrecy requirements of the Agency, and the=
>  improbable success of proving a negative assertion (that the Agency wasn't=
>  responsible).
>
> PsyOps: a factor to consider is that the accusations were made during an=20
> election period in a key state where the issue solidified a constituency=
>  into a=20
> solid position against their 'traditional' opposition. The issue is very=
>  much a=20
> political one, and directed at rekindling public animosity about past deeds=
>  (and misdeeds) to shape current public impressions. Again, the long term=
>  casualties of all this are the public trust and credibility of a key but=
>  troubled Agency; politically expedient attacks which undermine the=
>  political process; and the continued progression of the perversion of the=
>  information environment.
>
> Fictive environment: no proof was actually offered (mostly proof by=
>  assertion, as well as collateral association), but the very absence of=
>  proof feeds in to the mobile truth and psyops elements of the operation.=
>  Clearly no public documentation and argument could be offered from an=
>  Agency that must maintain its security and integrity, and no proof could be=
>  offered to prove the Agency wasn't involved, a negative assertion (a common=
>  element in this sort of propaganda operation).
>
> The CIA, Congress, and Justice Department are now engaged in investigations=
>  of the allegations; as such, they will be on-going events to continue the=
>  propaganda campaign, with a predictable end--the Agency finds no proof in=
>  their records and interviews, which is then interpreted as continuing=
>  evidence of a cover-up and conspiracy.
>
> Conclusion-- Media manipulation, particularly using the Internet as a method=
>  of propagation of the propaganda message or as an entry point into the=
>  conventional media cycle, is becoming more of a problem. Clearly everyone=
>  suffers, and the general atmosphere of distrust and disbelief, not to=
>  mention disgust, prevail.
>
> Michael Wilson
> 5514706@mcimail.com
> ------------------------------------------
> To:     infowar@infowar.com
> From: winn@infowar.com
> Date:  November 8, 1996
> Subj:  Electronic Civil Defense Becomes a National Issue
>
> In June of 1991, I testified before Congress that unless we moved forward as=
>  a nation, we faced the possible specter of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor."=
>  Five years to the day later, that same phrase was used by John Deutch and=
>  others to wake up Congress and America that indeed a new concept of=
>  national security has evolved as the Cold War wound down.
>
> I recently ran into a Libertarian friend and lawyer who was somewhat upset=
>  with me. "You are single handedly responsible for the backlash and efforts=
>  of law enforcement to take away our personal freedoms." He was referring to=
>  the comments made by FBI Director Louis Freeh, that additional electronic=
>  eavesdropping capabilities were needed to thwart the threats of domestic=
>  terrorism. He also referred to various law enforcement concerns that unless=
>  US citizens voluntarily complied with a Key Escrow scheme of some variety,=
>  it might be necessary to legislate a common cryptographic system which=
>  would not interfere with government investigations into crime and=
>  terrorism.
>
> "So, it's all my fault?" I asked him in the presence of others.
>
> He paused, and with only a twinge of humor said, "yes."
>
> Well, I do not believe or accept for a moment that the work we have done in=
>  the last several years is solely responsible for the extreme measures being=
>  discussed, but my friend's concerns are legitimate and must be addressed.=
>  He is keenly concerned, as many of us are, that recent headline grabbing=
>  events may trigger law enforcement to overreact and with the emotional=
>  support of many Americans, permit laws to be passed that a few short years=
>  ago we never would have tolerated.
>
> Civil Libertarians are quick to point out that if we permit law enforcement=
>  to regain unbridled powers of electronic eavesdropping, we provide them=
>  with the capability of abuse.
>
> "Today's government may be fine. But we don't know about tomorrow's=
>  government." They openly refer to the abuses of the Hoover FBI where, most=
>  of will admit, things did get out of hand. I've met with CIA case officers=
>  who feel hamstrung by their inability "to get the job done" in an effective=
>  way, because they are paying for the sins of their predecessors. Most of=
>  the FBI agents I know understand the legitimate fears of the civil=
>  liberties groups, but also know that they must have increased access to=
>  technology to defeat criminal activities.
>
> The issue comes down to one of balance. Pure and simple. "Whom do you trust"=
>  is a high profile collateral issue.=20
>
> But let's understand what has catalyzed much of these moves on the part of=
>  law enforcement:
>
> 	- The Oklahoma City bombing
> 	- The World Trade Center bombing
> 	- The Lockerbie Tragedy
> 	- The US Military Bombing in Saudi Arabia
> 	- TWA Flight 800
> 	- The Olympic Bombing
>
> These events trigger deep emotional responses on the part of most Americans=
>  and a call for action. "What can we do?" "Do something." "This shouldn't=
>  happen in America." "Protect us." And the predictable response from law=
>  enforcement is to ask for additional powers. Balance. It's all about=
>  balance.
>
> The critics say that Law Enforcement can push electronic taps past friendly=
>  judges with little inquiry on their part. The FBI says it takes a mass of=
>  paper work and evidence to convince a judge. There were less than 2,000=
>  phone taps issued last year - and I guess I feel that's not a whole lot.=
>  260,000,000 people, less than 2,000 taps. You add it up.=20
>
> Resources on the part of law enforcement are pretty scant. They do not have=
>  the budget or manpower to indiscriminately tap phones everywhere and=
>  analyze their contents. It's manpower intensive. They have to be selective.=
>  In many ways I wish they listened in on more of the bad guys. On one phone=
>  tap, an FBI agent told me, their target said in a taped conversation, "hey,=
>  the feds are tapping the phone. Let's whisper." Bad guys are not all rocket=
>  scientists.
>
> But on a national scale, we do indeed face a new risk, a new vulnerability,=
>  for which my friend blames me. It's all my fault. Right. In "Information=
>  Warfare" and other works, I maintained that the civilian infrastructure was=
>  the unacknowledged target of future adversaries.
>
> I don't believe we will see Submarines sailing up the Potomac, or that enemy=
>  planes will come into San Francisco Bay. Just won't happen. But I fear we=
>  will see attacks against the econo-technical infrastructure, affecting not=
>  only we citizens, but the ability of law enforcement and the military to=
>  function as we wish them to.
>
> On July 15 of this year, President Clinton issued an Executive Order calling=
>  for the Establishment of  President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure=
>  Protection.
>
> I applaud much of it, but I also think we have to maintain caution on how it=
>  is effected. His order says:
>
> Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or=
>  destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic=
>  security of the United States.
>
> These critical infrastructures include:
>
>  telecommunications,
>  electrical power systems,
>  gas and oil storage and transportation,
>  banking and finance,
>  transportation,
>  water supply systems,
>  emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and
>  continuity of government.
>
> Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories:
>
> 1. physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"),
>
> 2. and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on=
>  the information or communications components that control critical=
>  infrastructures ("cyber threats").
>
> Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the=
>  private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work=
>  together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their=
>  continued operation.
>
> This part of President Clinton's statement is right on the mark. These are=
>  all critical structures of the macro-sized econo-technical infrastructure,=
>  of which the NII and other bits are sub-infrastructures. However, when it=
>  comes to forming a committee, the people and groups he wishes to handle the=
>  problem are quite government-centric.
>
> 	- Department of the Treasury;
> 	- Department of Justice;
> 	- Department of Defense;
> 	- Department of Commerce;
> 	- Department of Transportation;
> 	- Department of Energy;
> 	- Central Intelligence Agency;
> 	- Federal Emergency Management Agency;
> 	- Federal Bureau of Investigation;
> 	- National Security Agency.
>
> The committee members are to include:
>
> 	- Secretary of the Treasury;
> 	- Secretary of Defense;
> 	- Attorney General;
> 	- Secretary of Commerce;
> 	- Secretary of Transportation;
> 	- Secretary of Energy;
> 	- Director of Central Intelligence;
> 	- Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
> 	- Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
> 	- Assistant to the President for National  Security Affairs;
> 	- Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs.
>
> The immediate concern I see is that the government wants to take charge on=
>  an issue and threat that is of mutual concern to the private sector and the=
>  government, but that at the highest levels of the President's Order and his=
>  Committee, we see no private sector representation. It is merely on a=
>  consultory basis.
>
> The Commission shall:
>
>         (a) within 30 days of this order, produce a statement of its mission=
>  objectives, which will elaborate the general objectives set forth in this=
>  order, and a detailed schedule for addressing each mission objective, for=
>  approval by the Steering Committee;
>
>         (b) identify and consult with: (i) elements of the public and=
>  private  sectors that conduct, support, or contribute to infrastructure=
>  assurance; (ii) owners and operators of the critical infrastructures; and=
>  (iii) other elements of the public and private sectors, including the=
>  Congress, that have an interest in critical infrastructure assurance issues=
>  and that may have differing perspectives on these issues;
>
>         (c) assess the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities of, and=
>  threats to, critical infrastructures;
>
>         (d) determine what legal and policy issues are raised by efforts to=
>  protect critical infrastructures and assess how these issues should be=
>  addressed;
>
>         (e) recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation=
>  strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber=
>  threats and assuring their continued operation;
>
>         (f) propose any statutory or regulatory changes necessary to effect=
>  its recommendations; and
>
>         (g) produce reports and recommendations to the Steering Committee as=
>  they become available; it shall not limit itself to producing one final=
>  report.
>
> I first wrote a National Infomation Policy in 1993, and I am pleased to see=
>  that the President has included similar wording. However, a national policy=
>  must, on balance, also provide for enhanced personal electronic security=
>  for the average American. It cannot be a one-sided law enforcement issue.=
> =20
>
> I worry about "consult with industry" along the same lines that the Key=
>  Escrow adherents consulted with industry, but generally did what they=
>  wanted to anyway. This has been an ongoing battle between industry and the=
>  White House with respect to "Clipper" style proposals and export control=
>  over encryption. Do we face the same situation with the Infrastructure=
>  Protection Committee?
>
> In this same vein, the President did recognize some input by the private=
>  sector:
>
> (a) The Commission shall receive advice from an advisory committee=
>  ("Advisory Committee") composed of no more than ten individuals appointed=
>  by the President from the private sector who are knowledgeable about=
>  critical infrastructures. The Advisory Committee shall advise the=
>  Commission on the subjects of the Commission's mission in whatever manner=
>  the Advisory Committee, the Commission Chair, and the Steering Committee=
>  deem appropriate.
>
> Again, the structure is that the government is in charge and the private=
>  sector, whose very interests are at stake here, is reduced to an Advisory=
>  status. This is a keen focus of concern.
>
> But then, a surprising phrase was in the President's Order:
>
> (f) The Commission, the Principals Committee, the Steering Committee, and=
>  the Advisory Committee shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order,=
>  unless extended by the President prior to that date.
>
> Only a year. I've been at this for years and years, and the awareness=
>  process takes significant time. There are still major players both in the=
>  government and the private sector who do not understand the nature of the=
>  threats and vulnerabilities, and I fear that a mere one year effort, led by=
>  some of the busiest people in the country today, will not receive the=
>  attention it deserves.
>
> My Civil Libertarian lawyer friend had significant problems with the=
>  following portion of the President's Order (for which I am blamed, of=
>  course!).
>
> (a) While the Commission is  conducting its analysis and until the President=
>  has an opportunity to consider and act on its recommendations, there is a=
>  need to increase  coordination of existing infrastructure protection=
>  efforts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that would have a=
>  debilitating regional or national impact.  There is hereby established an=
>  Infrastructure Protection Task Force ("IPTF") within the Department of=
>  Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to undertake this=
>  interim coordinating mission.
>
> (d) The IPTF shall include at least one full-time member each from the=
>  Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, and the=
>  National Security Agency.  It shall also receive part-time assistance from=
>  other executive branch departments and agencies. Members shall be=
>  designated by their departments or agencies on the basis of their expertise=
>  in the protection of critical   infrastructures.  IPTF members'=
>  compensation shall be paid by their parent agency or department.
>
> "Oh, great!" he exclaimed. "Now we're gonna have the Army sitting with=
>  M-16's outside the phone company, and the NSA listening in on Americans to=
>  see if they pollute the water supply. This is too damned much." He=
>  shuddered at the thought of having the these three groups working together=
>  on a domestic basis. It brought back to him too many memories of bygone=
>  days he would like to see remain in the past.
>
> On the other hand, what better group than the DoD to head up an effective=
>  response organization? The President, rightfully so, put the FBI and the=
>  Dept. of Justice in charge of the IPTF; after all they are responsible for=
>  domestic national law enforcement. But the DoD has massive resources,=
>  capabilities and manpower to deploy in times of trouble.
>
> The trouble is, and we will have to face this dilemma straight on, is that=
>  the US Military cannot be deployed in domestically due to the Posse=
>  Comitatus Act of 1878, without an Executive Order. And the NSA is similarly=
>  restricted from domestic operation, but is standing up its own 1,000 man=
>  Information Warfare division.=20
>
> There are legitimate ways around these problems, and we do need to have=
>  built-in oversights to satisfy the concerns of those who don't want the=
>  government taking over the whole shebang. But the concept of the IPTF's=
>  mission is again, absolutely on mark.
>
> (e) The IPTF's function is to identify and coordinate existing expertise,=
>  inside and outside of the Federal Government, to:
>
> (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance=
>  to critical infrastructures to detect, prevent, halt, or confine an attack=
>  and to recover and restore service;
>
> (ii) issue threat and warning notices in the event advance information is=
>  obtained about a threat;
>
> (iii) provide training and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities=
>  and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures;
>
> (iv) conduct after-action analysis to determine possible future threats,=
>  targets, or methods of attack; and
>
> (v)  coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or=
>  after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation.
>
> The Committee is supposed to address the very issues that many of us have=
>  been addressing - to full audiences, but often empty years. From where I=
>  stand, the White House has caught the vision and it prepared to do=
>  something about it.
>
> My complaints are essentially two fold:
>
> 	1. We have to have greater civilian input and representation on the=
>  Committee at the highest levels, not merely in an advisory capacity.
>
> 	2. The 1 year term is short-sided.
>
> And yes, I do agree with my Libertarian pal, that however this all shakes=
>  out, we must have a third party oversight process to insure we never do=
>  return to the abusive days of yore.
>
> Kudos to the White House for putting Electronic Civil Defense on their=
>  plate.
>
> For a complete copy of the Presidential Order: http://www.infowar.com
>
> Winn Schwartau
> ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> END
>
> Infowar             Sunday, November 10 1996        Volume 01: Number 02
>
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