From: ph@netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson)
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 1996 10:19:17 -0800 (PST)
To: "Douglas B. Renner" <dougr@skypoint-gw.globelle.com>
Subject: Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
Message-ID: <v02140b15aea927b911d3@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 5:53 AM 11/8/1996, Douglas B. Renner wrote:
>[snip]
>> The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely
>> accepted.  By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of
>> people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice.
>> Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop
>> to it.
>[snip]

> While this might be the case, I don't believe it is "key".

> Also, I'm not sure why you used this as a counterpoint.  Are you saying
> that there are not a significant number of people who think there is
> nothing wrong with sending truly private messages?  I would disagree
> with such an assertion based on my own converastions with crypto-ignorant
> aquaintances.  Most people either trust the gov't implicitly or haven't
> thought about it or (erroneously) consider it irrelevant - but deep down
> they definitely value their privacy.

They also definitely value their safety.  Sure, right now there are
lots of people who think strong cryptography is a good idea.  If
the Four Horsemen scenario is correct, that will change very quickly.

The reason I used this as a counterpoint is that the premise of
my discussion is that it would be possible - maybe even easy -
to suppress the use of non-GAKed cryptography were it unpopular.

A commonly shared belief among GAKers and Cypherpunks is that strong
cryptography is a magic bullet.  It isn't.  If it's not obviously
a disaster, strong cryptography will be widely used.  But if it
is a disaster and requires GAK, that's a policy option we will always
have.

Peter Hendrickson
ph@netcom.com