From: ph@netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson)
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 1996 13:53:05 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Magic Numbers in MD5
Message-ID: <v02140b03aed94aedb645@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 2:46 PM 12/14/1996, Mark M. wrote:
>On Fri, 13 Dec 1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote:
>> First, we have the four chaining variables, A, B, C, and D which
>> are initialized with apparently random numbers.
>
>Random?
>
>A = 0x01234567
>B = 0x89abcdef
>C = 0xfedcba98
>D = 0x76543210

Why yes, those bits are just as likely as any other set.  ;-)

At 11:39 AM 12/14/1996, Norman Hardy wrote:
>Perhaps random numbers would be stronger but they would not be manifestly
>random.  MD5's formula for t_i precludes the possibility that the definer
>of MD5 chose the numbers accoriding to some undisclosed principles that
>would allow him a trap door.

>The following code computes the magic numbers without requiring trig functions:
>
>...[nifty code sample redacted]...
>
>An alternative would have been to let t_i be MD4(i) or SHA(i).
>
>Using SHA to define MD5 would have required collusion between Rivest
>and NSA to allow for a trap door. Even then it would have been very difficult.

Still, one prefers to be careful.  Rivest is said to be a clever fellow.
One or two people at the NSA must know what they are doing.  We wouldn't
want to bet they aren't smart enough to invent something surprising.

Perhaps we should define MD5-Cypherpunks.  All interested parties submit
sealed random values for the chaining variables and the t_i constants.  The
new constants are determined by opening the envelopes and XORing all
the values.

This probably isn't worth the trouble given MD5's known weaknesses,
but it might be cool for other algorithms.  Does it seem reasonable
that this would make cryptanalysis more challenging?  One could
imagine that brute force attacks exist which are less efficient when
the same setup cannot be used for every message.  Or, that it is
expensive to determine weaknesses for particular sets of constants.

It would cause interoperability problems, but one could imagine
some organizations would prefer to use their own version of
standard algorithms for internal communications if it really
did raise the cost of attack.  The changes in software would
be minimal.

Incidentally, when weaknesses were discovered in MD5, did they depend
on a particular set of constants, or were the weaknesses general?  (I
assume the latter, but I would like to know for sure.)

Peter Hendrickson
ph@netcom.com