From: Tim Scanlon <tfs@adsl-122.cais.com>
To: stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Message Hash: 845c5e7acf2c1a2402f24a52bb86980454e9a8505fdb2b89528182c256e3a0cf
Message ID: <9612160526.AA21666@adsl-122.cais.com>
Reply To: <1.5.4.32.19961215201616.003aa660@popd.ix.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-12-16 05:27:50 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 15 Dec 1996 21:27:50 -0800 (PST)
From: Tim Scanlon <tfs@adsl-122.cais.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 1996 21:27:50 -0800 (PST)
To: stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Subject: Re: Gov't Clarifes Position-Surprise!
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19961215201616.003aa660@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9612160526.AA21666@adsl-122.cais.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
stewarts@ix.netcom.com said:
|----Begin Forwarded Message----
|>From EPIC http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/draft_regs_12_96.html
|
|**Commerce Department Prepares Draft Encryption Export Regulations**
|
|December 11, 1996
|
[snip]
|The regulations would amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
|by imposing national security and foreign policy controls ("EI" for
|Encryption Items) on certain information security systems and equipment,
|cryptographic devices (including recoverable encryption software) and
|related technology.
Basicly everything. Presuming or believing there are things that are exempt
from these regulations is foolish. They're like a rude salesman with a foot
in the door, they are not used to being told "no", nor will they stop at a simple
"no".
|
|For the first time, the Administration makes clear what it means by "Key
|Recovery Encryption." The regulations state that:
|
|For purposes of this rule, "recovery encryption products" refer to
|encryption products (including software) which allow law enforcement
|officials to obtain under proper legal authority and without
|the cooperation or knowledge of the user, the plaintext of encrypted data
|and communications.
This is the important part. US Law Enforcement, specificly the FBI, have a
serious desire to obliterate privacy. Reading of documents profiling what
they desire spans this, and the only "check" they speak of or envision
is that of a warrant or other legal means to do so. I say "other legal means"
because they'll probably start chipping away & narrowly interpreting the
privacy act as soon as they achieve this goal. As it stands, it's entirely too
easy for them to get basic search warrants, and I believe they want to do
a technology conversion on that to be able to engage in digital wiretapping
& searches. I think they believe computers, properly governed, can make their
jobs easier. In this case laziness is the root of all evil.
The sick thing is the closest I can come to governmental analogues to what
they propose are organizations like the East German Stasi, Stalin's secret police,
and other similar police organizations who effectively utilize technology to curtail
liberty. In todays society, they don't have to make people "disappeared", but rather
to just do it to people's technology. The FBI does this now as things stand. Punitive
seizure of computers without indictments or charges are relatively commonplace. I
believe the whole situation is going to get worse as they continue to chip away at
crypto. They certainly are NOT acting as protectors of liberty in the US in any way
with these proposals.
|
|This is an exact description of the original Clipper encryption proposal
|that was widely opposed by Internet users and industry when it was
|announced in 1993.
Clipper 3.11 shares all the same goals, and in fact, as time has passed, while
they try to chip away at privacy, it has become even more apparent that the
goals they want are regressive in terms of what we in the US consider basic
freedoms, and that they're Orwellian and frightening when you think about the
long haul. Expect a 'Clipper 95' if this subsides or gets shot down. These people
are in it for the long haul. Snooping has always been the lazy mans way to engage
in law enforcement, and is obviously the most comprehensive choice. Privacy is
very inconvenient to the "needs" (ever notice they never have 'wants'? and always
have some horrific example to dredge up, no matter how fluky or 1-in-a-million, to
justify what they "need"? Funny how that works out.) of law enforcement.
Expect some form of cooperation with EC governments if this stuff goes through.
The recent posting to cypherpunks about the "radikal" raid in the Netherlands is
probably a good foreshadowing of this. If you have not seen the article, and want to,
I will be happy to remail it.
Tim Scanlon
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