1997-01-18 - Re: Key Revokation Scheme

Header Data

From: Rich Graves <rcgraves@disposable.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1264b3971bdf8a30408b0b47a5f5f245901af8976986f2ceeb29372aff843637
Message ID: <32E01A37.702D@disposable.com>
Reply To: <>
UTC Datetime: 1997-01-18 00:35:12 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 17 Jan 1997 16:35:12 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Rich Graves <rcgraves@disposable.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 1997 16:35:12 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Revokation Scheme
In-Reply-To: <>
Message-ID: <32E01A37.702D@disposable.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Bill Stewart wrote:
>Key revocation certificates don't leak your private keys,
>so the only risk if the Bad Guys get a copy is denial of service,
>including the pain of rebuilding all your connections, etc.;

I concur. Depending on your application (it always depends on your
application), it's probably better to risk a spurious revocation than
an interception.

You needn't completely lose your connection to the web of trust,
either. I've already generated a "next" key signed by my current key,
just in case. No, the path server won't follow revoked keys, but
someone not yet in possession of the revocation certificate is
somewhat more likely to accept a message from someone with a key signed
by your old key and in possession of the revocation certificate.