1997-01-23 - Re: Newt’s phone calls

Header Data

From: snow <snow@smoke.suba.com>
To: “Phillip M. Hallam-Baker” <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Message Hash: 6dbc975de6b7ea1befe32132b25115a8fcaae7396c4ca7e88c7ab8bbd5688cea
Message ID: <199701230026.QAA01806@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-01-23 00:26:13 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 16:26:13 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: snow <snow@smoke.suba.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 16:26:13 -0800 (PST)
To: "Phillip M. Hallam-Baker" <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Newt's phone calls
Message-ID: <199701230026.QAA01806@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Hallam-baker said:
> Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...
> 
> > GSM encrypts only the links to the station - the traffic goes in the
> > clear through the station.  Plus A5 (crypto algorithm used in GSM) is
> > weak, 40 bits of effective key space.
> > 
> > It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,
> 
> I disagree for two reasons, first there is a big difference between having
> poor locks and no locks. Most locks can be picked by an expert, they are
> effective against many theifs however.
> 
> Second if everyone in the world was using 40 bit email encryption it
> would prevent most of the "promiscuous" interception of communications.

    Third (as Mr. Vulis <insult deleted> observed) the jump from using poor 
crypto to using good crypto is a lot shorter than not using crypto to 
using good crypto. 

    Once people get it in there heads that crypto is good to use, then 
it is easier to convince them to use "unbreakable" crypto than to convince 
non-crypto-users.








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