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   [IMAGE]
   
  Chapter VII: Libel
  
   Fault
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   The Supreme Court has recognized different standards for different
   types of libel plaintiffs, with public officials and public figures
   required to show a high degree of fault.
   
   Celebrities and others with power in a community are usually
   considered public figures. Politicians and high-ranking government
   personnel are public officials.
   
   Courts generally consider public officials to include public employees
   who have substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
   governmental affairs. Some courts have found that public school
   teachers and police officers are public officials.
   
   But determining if other people are private or public figures is not
   always easy. In some instances, there may be overlapping in the
   private and public category. For example, a businessperson who has
   high visibility because of fundraising efforts in a community may or
   may not be a public figure for all purposes.
   
   A plaintiff who is considered a public figure or official must prove
   that the publisher or broadcaster acted with "actual malice" in
   reporting derogatory information. "Actual malice" does not mean ill
   will or intent to harm. Instead, the term applies to whether the
   defendant knew that the challenged statements were false or acted with
   reckless disregard of the truth.
   
   Courts may examine reporting procedures in testing for actual malice.
   While carelessness is not usually considered reckless disregard,
   ignoring obvious ways of substantiating allegations could be
   considered reckless.
   
   In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, the Supreme Court
   held that even an extreme deviation from professional standards, or
   the publication of a story to increase circulation, do not in
   themselves prove actual malice. The Court also said that while failure
   to investigate facts does not necessarily prove actual malice, a
   "purposeful avoidance of the truth" may.
   
   Use of quotations that are not literally accurate will not necessarily
   be considered proof of actual malice as long as the altered quotes do
   not materially change the meaning of the words the speaker used. In
   Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, the Supreme Court acknowledged
   that some editing of quotations is often necessary, but refused to
   extend protection to all edits that are at least a "rational
   interpretation" of what the speaker said.
   
   If the plaintiff is a private litigant, he or she must at least prove
   that the publisher or broadcaster was negligent in failing to
   ascertain that the statement was false and defamatory. Some states may
   impose a higher burden on private-figure litigants, especially if the
   story in question concerns a matter of public importance.
   
   
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