From: Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 1997 13:02:47 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (U.S.) National Cryptography Policy (paper and report)
Message-ID: <v0300781caf059945bb9c@[139.167.130.248]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Date:         Fri, 17 Jan 1997 14:09:24 CST
Reply-To:     Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              <CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
Sender:       Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              <CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
From:         Lyonette Louis-Jacques <llou@MIDWAY.UCHICAGO.EDU>
Subject:      (U.S.) National Cryptography Policy (paper and report)
Comments: To: net-lawyers@eva.dc.LSOFT.COM
To:           CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM

I'm forwarding this post to the CYBERIA-L and NET-LAWYERS lists as I
think subscribers might be interested in these documents (include
discussion of export controls), and their implication for
international communications.  Cheers, Lyo (Lyonette Louis-Jacques at
llou@midway.uchicago.edu):

Cryptography and the National Resource Council: The Role of Private Groups
in Public Policy, by Kenneth W. Dam, is now available on the Web.

http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Occasional/

The Role of Private Groups in Public Policy is adapted from a
presentation made to the Presidents' Circle of the National Academy of
Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, Washington, D.C., November 21,
1996.  It was recently issued as Occasional Paper No. 38 by the University
of Chicago Law School.

Kenneth W. Dam, Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University
of Chicago Law School, was the Chair of the National Research Council's
Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy.  The Committee unanimously
recommended eliminating restrictions on domestic use of encryption, and
progressively relaxing restrictions on export.  The government's concerns
that national security and law enforcement agencies would be unable to
eavesdrop on criminals and terrorists must be balanced against the dangers
that American firms would be unable to lawfully use encryption strong enough
to protect electronic commerce, and that American software developers,
forced to use key escrow/key recovery encryption in their products ("a
Maginot Line of defense against hackers") would find no market for their
products.

A late draft of the Committee's Report, "Cryptography's Role in Securing
the Information Society," is available at their home page:

http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/2646.html

-----------
                                              Paradise is exactly like
                +                             where you are right now
      .&______~*@*~______&.       m           only much, much, better
    "w/%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%\w"    mmm***       ------------------------
      `Y""Y""Y"""""Y""Y""Y'      mm*****      Language -- it's a shipwreck,
   p-p_|__|__|_____|__|__|_q-q   mm**Y**      it's a job - Laurie Anderson
_-[EEEEM==M==MM===MM==M==MEEEE]-_.|..|....    (two .sigs sighted on the Net)

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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/
FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://offshore.com.ai/fc97/
"If *you* don't go to FC97, *I* don't go to FC97"