From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 1997 18:42:46 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Will off-topic libertarian bullshit be allowed on the moderated mailing list?
Message-ID: <199701060239.UAA03419@manifold.algebra.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hello,

For a long time, cypherpunks mailing list has been plagued by
two types of irrelevant traffic: 

	1) Flames by Vulis against cypherpunks and by cypherpunks against
	   Vulis.
	2) Off-topic rants about libertarian ideology, guns, poverty,
	   Ebonics, etc etc.

Both types of messages were equally damaging to the content that I
consider worth reading: discussions about applications of cryptography,
protocols and crypto-related code. As a result, most of the people who
used to talk about cryptosystems do not do so anymore because they moved
to other, less noisy, forums.

It was very sad to see that nobody except Eric Murray wanted to
seriously try to discuss IPG algorithm, which was in my opinion an
excellent case study of a home-grown cryptosystem. Eric wrote lots of
excellent C code to check the "random" number generator, but no one else
was interested.

Cypherpunks's uniqueness and appeal is not in the breadth of issues
discussed: there are forums dedicated to libertarian issues, guns,
languages, terrorism, and so on. The mission of this forum, as I
understand it, was to provide amateurs with interest in applying
cryptography, and professional cryptographers alike, a good place to
discuss crypto-related issues productively.

It is understandable that many of those people who subscribe to
cypherpunks' credo of digital freedom happen to be devoted libertarians
and have strong views on other political subjects. It does not justify
bringing every important issue to this mailing list, however.

If restrictions on content are to be imposed, it is not only fair
but also rational to exclude off-topic political rants as well as 
flames. Both of these categories add zero value to accomplishing
Cypherpunks' mission.

	- Igor.

Appendix: what we all received when we subscribed:

Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more
of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their
own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and
couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from
speaking about their experiences or their opinions.

The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To
encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt with
weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.
Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best
to defend it.

Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.  Cypherpunks wish
to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of
it.  Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social
structures.  Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to
defend it.  Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
cryptosystems.

Cypherpunks love to practice.  They love to play with public key
cryptography.  They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail
forwarding and delivery.  They love to play with DC-nets.  They love
to play with secure communications of all kinds.

Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress.

Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. 
Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.

Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy.

[Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]