1997-02-08 - Re: anonymous remailers

Header Data

From: Jeremiah A Blatz <jer+@andrew.cmu.edu>
To: cypherpunks-unedited@toad.com
Message Hash: 1f73f6f102f89eced04f25978a55792cf784f708ef3d3cdeb4d048fdc0cb31f9
Message ID: <0mz38b200YUh0Qosg0@andrew.cmu.edu>
Reply To: <199702062301.PAA02208@toad.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-02-08 07:59:31 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 23:59:31 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Jeremiah A Blatz <jer+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 23:59:31 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks-unedited@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous remailers
In-Reply-To: <199702062301.PAA02208@toad.com>
Message-ID: <0mz38b200YUh0Qosg0@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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Andrew Loewenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com> writes:
> Charley Musselman writes:
> >  Does anyone know the answer?  Specifically, how can we choose
> >  a trusted remailer?
> 
> The answer is to run your own remailer.  Make sure your chain includes your  
> remailer at least once.  If you can't trust yourself, who can you trust?

Ummm, if you run your own remailer, and don't get lots of people to
use it, then traffic analysis will reveal that you are the sender
quite quickly. It will pretty much make everything in the chain before
your remiler useless. If you send your message through remailers a, b,
c, and d like this:

you -> a -> b -> c -> d -> alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen

and only you use c, then your effective chain is:

someone who could only be you -> d -> alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen

This chain is weak indeed.

Jer

"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
 why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole

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