From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv@bwalk.dm.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 23:28:25 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Geiger and long, unreadable lines
Message-ID: <199702050728.XAA18196@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:

>
> Dimitri Vulis <dlv@bwalk.dm.com> writes on cpunks-flames:
> > Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes on cpunks-flames:
> > >
> > > Mr William H. Geiger III "Author of E-Secure" writes on cpunks:
> > > > <sigh> for the benifit of those misfortunate enough to be still working
> > > > dumb terminals I have disabled my PGP script until I have time to add a
> > > > word wrap routine to it.
> > >
> > > <sigh> it is you who were demonstrating your ineptitude by spewing
> > > 120+ line length postings.  Why is it so difficult for you to keep
> > > under 80 chars?  Would you like some technical assistance?  Notice how
> > > near every one else apart from yourself is managing to keep under 80
> > > chars?
> >
> > Notice how near every one else apart from yourself bends over for the NSA,
> > and is willing to use a 40-bit key "escrowed" with the feds?  Why is it so
> > difficult for you to keep under 40 bits? Would you like some technical
> > assistance? Why are you setting yourself apart from the Internet community
> > that so happily embraces GAK? Why do you desire "privacy" for your traffic
> > when everyone else does not? What have you got to hide? Are you looking to
> > transmit child pornography, bomb-making instructions, and/or cannabis
> > legalization propaganda? We better have a look at your hard disk soon.
>
> btw Dimitri, a crypto question:
>
> Diffie-Hellman key generation, there are two main ways of generating
> the diffie-hellman prime modulus, method 1:
>
> 	p = 2q+1
>
> where q is a prime also.
>
> And method 2:
>
> 	p = r.2q+1
>
> where q is a prime and r is a randomly generated number.
>
> With method 1, the security parameter is the size of p in bits (or
> size of q, as they are related).
>
> With method 2, there are two security parameters, size of q and size
> of p in bits.
>
> Method 2 has the advantage that key generation is faster as it is
> quicker to generate new random numbers r, than to repeatedly generate
> trial prime q as you have to do in method 1.  However is the security
> weaker in method 2?  What size of p and q do you have to use to get
> the same security as for same size of p in bits as in method 1?  What
> should be the relationship between the size of p and q?
>
> (this isn't cpunks, this is cpunks-flames, so your non-crypto pledge
> shouldn't hold, besides Sandy has a stated policy of killing the whole
> thread, so I thought it amusing to continue your crypto relevance in
> moving on to technical topics rather than political)

My advice is to stay clear of any cryptosystem that relies on factoring
being hard. I'll send you pointers to some very interesting new work
based on the zeta function in private e-mail when I dig it up (please
remind me if/when I forget this promise). I'm reluctant to say anything
crypto-relevant on this defunct mailing list because last time I did,
the moderator repeatedly cited it as evidence that his moderation works.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps