From: Sean Roach <roach_s@ALPH.SWOSU.EDU>
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 1997 14:43:00 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Excerpt on SPAM from Edupage, 11 February 1997
Message-ID: <199702162243.OAA05066@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 04:45 PM 2/15/97 -0600, Igor Chudov wrote:
>Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
...
>> Or that the money wasn't there in the first place (absent a trusted
>> signature system), or the key doesn't exist, or the wrong key is
>> offered, or the sender put the same e-dollar on all 60000 mails sie
>> sent and it's already been redeemed.
>
>Well, if the trusted party performs the encryption by both recipient's
>public key and the "retrieval key", the problem that you mention can 
>be avoided.
Yeah.  I as a spam artist send the "proof" message through the e-cash
verification center with the Send To: field returning it to a mail exploder.
Each receipient gets the same dollar.
This assumes that the To: field is not hashed into the verification
signature, and that the verification works like a glorified remailer.  (cash
added on a separate channel).