1997-03-22 - Re: FBI Visits JPUNIX

Header Data

From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
To: nobody@huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Message Hash: 456b8c0ce42bf21fa33a45860f19cef181db8c87dd00b9ff6777883a65d82bfc
Message ID: <199703220138.TAA25090@manifold.algebra.com>
Reply To: <199703210742.XAA21100@mailmasher.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-03-22 01:50:10 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:50:10 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:50:10 -0800 (PST)
To: nobody@huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Subject: Re: FBI Visits JPUNIX
In-Reply-To: <199703210742.XAA21100@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <199703220138.TAA25090@manifold.algebra.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>   Anonymous continued:
> >   Efforts to send it through a second remailer also failed, with no
> > notice from the server of any problems being received. Other email
> > sent through the remailer at the same time encountered no difficulties.
> 
> Later the same day John Perry wrote:
> >         Due to an FBI investigation that was opened recently naming
> > myself and jpunix as suspects, I have decided that the heat taken by
> > remailer operators due to those individuals that can't control
> > themselves has become unacceptable. 
> 

Note that remailer users should admit the possibility of a government
agent being among remailer operators. I have very high regards to John
Perry personally, but believe me, it does not a lot of effort to 
subvert a more regular person. It is generally easy to find some
"crime" that normally would not be prosecuted and and then bullied
into submission.

A reasonably risk-averse remailer users should accept that probability 
and never assume that one or two remailers in a chain is enough for
anything serious. As well, I strongly object to remailer operators
openly discussing who sent what to whom (as it recently happened).

If a remailer operator discovers that a certain user is spamming his
service, he could publish a hash (not cryptographically strong) of the
offender's email address and not teh address itself.

	- Igor.





Thread