From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 17:09:18 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: US Spies Vacuum Germany
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This week's Spiegel has a three-page follow-up article on the CIA spy:

Der Spiegel No. 12 / 1997, pp. 34-36.

Espionage / "Dinner for Two"

  For almost three years, a CIA agent has pumped a Head of Unit in
  Bonn's Economy Ministry.  The US agencies' wild actions no longer
  are taboo.

The official Klaus Dieter von Horn, 60, ex officio is on the guard of
spies - the Superior Counsellor in the Economy Ministry is responsible
for the Arabian area.  As the head of unit VB7 - that concentrates on
Iran - knows, spies from the Near East, but also from other areas,
take a keen interest in the files on his desk.

Nevertheless, at first the official did not pay much attention to
Geoffry Plant's efforts.  After all, he was in diplomatic duty of the
big brother USA.  Horn and Plant got to know each other late in 1994,
and the American invited the German to a dinner for two every three or
four weeks.  The US embassy's IInd Secretary liked to chat about his
employer and kept asking even more questions about Horn's ministry.

He had Horn explain the political background of the Mykonos lawsuit,
and was interested in the Hermes credits to Iran.  When Bonn in August
1995 asked Iran to send two employees of their office in Bonn on
vacation without return tickets because they had been unveiled as
spies, Plant wanted to know all details.

Another time, he politely asked for a list of those firms that deliver
all sorts of goods, especially high tech, to the Mullahs' state.  The
Ministerial Counsellor remained courteous, but refused: He was not
allowed to hand over those papers, Plant surely knew that?  The
American did understand, but he would not give up.

Last year in May, he again invited Horn to dinner.  He was leaving the
embassy, he said, and on farewell still handed over a Montblanc pen of
almost 300 DM worth.  Also, he introduced his successor: Peyton K
Humphries, a diplomat working on Iran.  Plant asked him not to forget
that name.

That was for granted.  Other authorities were already awaiting the US
embassy's new second secretary with large interest: The German
intelligence agencies wanted to check if the Americans were willing to
continue the agents game in diplomatic undercover.

Because already in Summer 1995, after the first talks with Plant, wary
Horn had contacted the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the Bundesamt
für Verfassungsschutz (BfV).  Obviously, he reported, American spies
were assigned to him.

He correctly informed the BfV about the various meetings and also
handed over presents such as pens and champagne.  Then, as Humphries
queried him about the ongoing construction of the nuclear power plant
of Busher after his return from a trip to Teheran, Horn described the
US interest in full detail.

What was happening there, was a textbook case to the BfV agent
hunters: Spies from a foreign power wanted to recruit a German top
official.  It is the spy school's ABC to first give the source test
orders such as obtaining material from an open source - as in Horn's
case.  Also typical: The German was supposed not to talk to anyone
about the encounters, including US embassy staff.  Humphries: "There
are two competing camps."  The CIA and the embassy's economy department
don't get on well with each other.

After the German counterespionage experts had dropped all plans to
crack the US embassy that lies at the Rhine like a fortress at
Deichmanns Aue 29, or to tap Humphries' telephone, in this February
BfV head Peter Frisch talked to the head of the CIA in Bonn, Floyd L
Paseman.  Humphries, Frisch demanded, was to leave the country, the
Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Office were annoyed.

Paseman denied espionage, but assured that the CIA agent would leave
until May 30.  He insistently asked to handle the incident most
discreetly.

It failed.  Since Der Spiegel reported first details about the
snooping last week, the relations between the goverment and Washington
are not free from irritations.

In the US, comparisons were made with France kicking out four CIA
agents in 1995.  "Why do the United States spy out their friends?"
the Wall Street Journal asked.  "Shame", said the Chicago Tribune's
editorial.  Washington still treated Germany as an agents center like
"in the age of Cold War".

The timid in Bonn now are afraid of trouble with the big brother.  But
there also is relief.  Kicking the CIA man out gives the chance to no
longer treat espionage among friends as a taboo.

Six and a half years after re-unification and the end of the allied
forces' privileges in Germany, the Germans in the conspirative area
still are not the masters of their own house.  Still, some Western
agencies - the Americans at the head - act like in their own backyard.

Hortensie I, the BND's synonym for the CIA, and Hortensie III, as the
most sinister American intelligence agency, the National Security
Agency (NSA) is referred to, resemble the flower of the same name: a
shrublike plant with strong roots.

The "friendly agencies" are increasingly active in the capital,
Berlin's Secretary of State of the Interior Kuno Böse (CDU) reported
in February.  In mid-February, the heads of the Offices for the
Protection of the Constitution met in Bad Neuenahr to "re-structure
counter-intelligence".  "Focussing on the East", they noted as item 4,
"would not correspond to political reality any more".

Looking to the West shows surprising activity: More than 1,000 wiretap
technicians and 100 professional US agents bustle about in Germany,
security experts estimate.  20 intelligence officers are suspected in
the American embassy at the Rhine alone.

The friendly power's spies are in consulates, allied supreme command,
and barracks.  They try to recruit agents in Germany, they tap sources
without consultation, and whoever uses a telephone between the Alps
and the Baltic Sea must be aware that the NSA be switched in -
attention, the friend is listening.

Before 1990, the American eavesdroppers were ubiquitious.  They
maintained a listening post on the mountain Teufelsberg in Berlin, to
listen to East Berlin, and probably the West as well.  In Frankfort am
Main, close to the Zeil, there was another impressive listening post.

In the Lech plain near Gablingen, the Americans constructed a powerful
circular antenna grid - some 300 meters of diameter and 100 meters of
heigth.  Upside, they were listening on short wave to the Eastern
generals' orders.  What they were doing in the underground, has
remained their secret.

The Teufelsberg has been left, as the Americans moved further to the
East.  The Frankfort subsidiary has also been closed, and Gablingen
will be given up next year.

But the Americans' pride, their "giant ear" in Germany, will remain,
and it makes the ordinary wiretap look rather ordinary.  The site is
located in Bad Aibling, Upper Bavaria.  In an idyllic landscape, the
empire of Hortesie III extends immensely.  Gigantic antenna facilities
that in their covers rise above the plain like huge gulf balls are
eavesdropping Russian military.  Russian sattelites are tapped, the
telephone traffic directed to the formerly Soviet army is recorded.

Right next to it, in the German Mangfall barrack, resides the BND's
so-called long distance radio traffic site.  It (object "Orion") may
use the American antennae, nearly 100 eavesdroppers are analyzing the
cyrillic babel of speech.

But the peace is deceptive.  The intelligence empire NSA (estimated
budget: 3.5 billion dollar, about 100,000 employees) maintains a large
complex in Bad Aibling that is terra incognita to the German agencies.
By far, it is not just about the legitimate American safety interests.

In the midst of Germany, there is a control center for the many
American espionage sattelites that, according to a security expert in
Bonn, "long since do not only spy out the East".  The celestial bodies
of American origin circulating in close orbit suck in electronic
signals above Germany like a huge vacuum cleaner.  With encrypted
signals, Bad Aibling queries the memory of the satellites and searches
the collected phone conversations, faxes and computer traffic for
interesting stuff.

Until 1995 the site officially used the name of the NSA.  To keep up
appearances, then a US Air Force lieutenant colonel took over command,
the military flag is demonstratively fluttering in the wind.  But
still more than 1,000 eavesdroppers are working in the huge complex,
according to BND estimates.  Estimated 150 of them are directly from
the NSA that does the controlling and sets the tasks.

In spite of many inquiries, Hortensie III has strictly denied to
exchange all information from "non-military intelligence".  The BND,
they argue, can offer nothing of comparable value.

But it probably is more about not telling the Germans what they really
do.  If American and German security experts are right, European
companies are systematically spied out from Bad Aibling.

Years ago, US president Bill Clinton decreed American agencies to
larger commitment in economic espionage.  When the European airplane
giant Airbus Industries, of which Germany holds 37.9%, was competing
for a large Saudi Arabian contract with two US groups, the NSA
intervened.  It intercepted all faxes and phone conversations between
Airbus and the Saudis.  So, the Americans knew their opponent and
their offers were unbeatable - after all the orders valued at six
billion dollars.

While the British and French to a certain extend respect Germany's
souvereignty, the Americans, who had brought up the BND, behave like a
victor power.  They insist on supplementary agreements on intelligence
cooperation with "the allied forces".  Thus, the Germans must respect
"necessities of military safety" of Nato contingents here.  There is
much room for secretive manners in German territory.

In its "Westport" office in the East of Munich, the CIA until now
maintains a so-called inquiry office.  The Americans ask
asylum-seeking refugees and emigrants from whom they expect
informaition to come to Munich from all Germany.  Pro forma, the BND
is asked for endorsement, but the talks usually take place without
German participation, and the BND does not learn about possible CIA
recruitments.

The Americans are questioning deserted Russian soldiers, war refugees
from former Yugoslavia, and asylum-seekers from the Near East.  The
VIPs of them are offered asylum in the USA.  Even applicants from
overseas are brought to the experts in Munich for interrogation.

For a long time, German politics have ignored the activities of the
rogue agency.  In autumn 1994, the Chancellor's Office installed a
working group, strictly confidential of course, to get the American
and other friendly agencies under control.

Three ministries and three intelligence agencies were sitting at the
table, headed by Rudolf Dolzer, professor of international law, at
that time Head of Unit in the Chancellor's Office.  "What they are
doing here is not possible", Dolzer got exited.  "They must comply
with law and oder."

The group boldly planned to prohibit the Americans from interrogating
asylum-seekers without German participation, in Bad Aibling BND
specialists should watch the NSA, recruiting sources should be
prohibited.  After all - they concluded - espionage activities also
from friendly states are not politically protected.

In 1995, their will of protection suddenly vanished.  Distances
between meetings grew longer, finally the Chancellor's Office didn't
send out invitations any more.  Above all, the BfV that already had
created lists with names of suspicious agents was disappointed.
"Someone on the very top must have pulled the plug", someone from an
intelligence agency says.

It is dubious if the case of CIA agent Humphries will cause with the
Americans to change their policy.  At least, friendship with America
means a big deal to Helmut Kohl who does not consider the intelligence
business especially important.

The Chancellor is not even scared by the sinister NSA.  He does have
telephones that are guaranteed to be wiretap-proof.  Even when he is
on vacation at the Wolfgangsee [in Austria], the BND always installs a
device which not even the NSA can crack.  But the secure devices have
one important drawback: First the partner has to stop speaking before
you can speak yourself.

That is why the Chancellor to the displeasure of the security people
prefers the old telephone - a friend trusts a friend.

[End]

Thanks to anonymous.

For earlier reports on US spying in Germany:

http://jya.com/despon.txt
http://jya.com/ciaami.txt
http://jya.com/really.txt