From: Dave Emery <die@pig.die.com>
To: hal@rain.org
Message Hash: 547a58e803a8c0c0eca14b672f38c660d02e53568d527f732a8ed1c1457157b1
Message ID: <199704070518.BAA03813@pig.die.com>
Reply To: <199704070406.VAA05440@coyote.rain.org>
UTC Datetime: 1997-04-07 05:18:51 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 6 Apr 1997 22:18:51 -0700 (PDT)
From: Dave Emery <die@pig.die.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Apr 1997 22:18:51 -0700 (PDT)
To: hal@rain.org
Subject: Re: Crypto Dongel
In-Reply-To: <199704070406.VAA05440@coyote.rain.org>
Message-ID: <199704070518.BAA03813@pig.die.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Hal Finney wrote :
> However if the system is designed to make it easy when it does become
> necessary, it will probably be easy to at least occasionally activate the
> feature accidentally. The result will be the loss of your keys.
For what little it is worth, key zeroization is built into
almost all US government crypto gear, usually with prominent switches on
the front panel marked "zeroize" for emergencies. And most all of this
gear has tamper switches that activate the zeroizing logic when any of
the covers of the equipment are removed - and often there is more than one
zeroize circuit in a system in case the primary one fails to work.
My understanding is that the NSA has rather specific and detailed
requirements for this feature in gear being designed for them, and one
can certainly see why it would be a requirement in military systems that
might have to be quickly rendered useless to an enemy in the moments before
capture.
So it is hardly a new idea.
Dave Emery
die@die.com
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