From: jimbell@pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 10:53:27 +0800
To: Tim May <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
Message-ID: <199705010238.TAA04266@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 21:32 4/29/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 9:15 PM -0800 4/29/97, Jim Bell wrote:
>>For example, I consider a major nuclear powers' possession of nukes to be
>>one of the most serious examples of "nuclear terrorism" there is, but on the
>>other hand I believe that an appropriate use of crypto (AP) could force any
>>owners of nuclear weapons to dismantle them.  Few people challenge this
>>claim.  If I'm right, crypto is a solution rather than a problem.  Why not
>>remind that journalist that her false impression is the real problem, not
>>crypto.
>
>I believe you are incorrect that AP would force dismantling of nukes, for
>reasons I am weary of repeating (you repeat your matra, I repeat mine),

Well, you're entitled to be wrong!  B^)

I have always been willing to defend my assertion, and since it hasn't been
discussed recently I think it's not too soon to rehash, as weary as you may be.

Assuming AP works in particular, and crypto-anarchy works in general, both
will work to  reduce and minimize the "height" and size of government
entities everywhere. Looked at from a cost/benefit standpoint, since nuclear
weapons are generally of a certain minimum size and cost, they only "work"
if the enemy is sufficiently numerous and segregated from the non-enemy
populace to make attack with a large bomb effective.  Reduce the size of the
largest government unit, and it's harder to find a useful target, thus
reducing the benefit of owning nukes.   Also, if an AP system were available
to an individual or group that previously owned nukes, it would be a far
more economical (and specific) tool to defend itself from enemies of a
certain limited size.  (you can't nuke a terrorist cell, for instance, at
least not without making far more enemies than you originally had.)

At some point, nukes will become far "larger" a weapon than any owner can
reasonably use, and at that point he will disassemble it due to sheer
uselessness.   (if you don't believe that the average size of the potential
nuke-owners will get smaller, then you obviously don't believe in AP and/or
crypto-anarchy!)

AP dramatically increases the "cost" of owning nukes as well:   If I were
free to do so, I'd be happy to donate money to help force the few
nuke-owners to dismantle their bombs.  Assuming more than a small fraction
of the population is sympathetic to this use of AP (and even if they
generally would oppose other uses) this will work.  Nukes won't be useful to
"fight back" against AP and/or crypto-anarchy, and in fact threatening their
use will do nothing except strength the argument in favor of the development
and use of AP as an anti-nuke tool.

Generally, in order to claim that a fully-functioning AP system WON'T
dismantle all nukes, you've got to be able to postulate the kind of
nuke-owning organization that could survive in a post-AP world, and further
suggest what reason that organization would have to own them.


> but
>I agree that serious discussion of such game-theoretic issues is just too
>scary, too extreme, too un-American for almost everyone.

You'd be surprised.  Since having had at least my second "15 minutes of
fame" locally, I've had many discussions of the AP concept with average
citizens.  Admittedly, many of them were no more familiar with the
cryptographic details than you might expect, so they pretty much accepted
that part of the proposal as a given.  However, every one of them seemed to
accept the idea that if my system would do, generally, what it appears to do
from first principles, the conclusion that it would shut down militaries and
dismantle nukes follows directly.  

Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com