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1997-06-10 - Re: Access to Storage and Communication Keys

Header Data

From: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
To: cryptography@c2.net
Message Hash: 4b043cbe43d6b57ef54baadc40e76910ea62e9b8e3156b0f66af6732bcd66f00
Message ID: <19970610112926.04400@bywater.songbird.com>
Reply To: <3.0.1.32.19970610090503.00747630@popd.ix.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-06-10 18:49:14 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 11 Jun 1997 02:49:14 +0800

Raw message

From: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 1997 02:49:14 +0800
To: cryptography@c2.net
Subject: Re: Access to Storage and Communication Keys
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970610090503.00747630@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970610112926.04400@bywater.songbird.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Tue, Jun 10, 1997 at 12:12:36PM -0700, Phil Helms wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Jun 1997, Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> > and you have potentially decent business reasons for backup
> > of storage keys, but that's only the case if you're not using
> > a sufficiently flexible cryptosystem and are using key backup
> > instead of data backup, which is really the preferred approach anyway.)
> 
> I could envision situations where you wouldn't want to backup plaintext,
> but only ciphertext.  In those situations, key backup would also be
> necessary.  This would require the use of passphrases or some other
> tokens to utilize the backed up keys.

If you have data you wish to guard from disclosure I think that in
most circumstances you want to back up ciphertext.  It is a *lot*
cheaper to secure a piece of paper with a passphrase on it (in a safe
deposit box, for example) than it is guard a gigabyte of backup tapes. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html

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