1997-06-30 - Re: Hettinga’s e$yllogism

Header Data

From: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Message Hash: 689ffe956787e2d26ec196883a59be1409998b3730316f572f0cc189ca33369a
Message ID: <19970630111759.13667@bywater.songbird.com>
Reply To: <19970628163155.33743@bywater.songbird.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-06-30 18:44:28 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 1 Jul 1997 02:44:28 +0800

Raw message

From: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 1997 02:44:28 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: Re: Hettinga's e$yllogism
In-Reply-To: <19970628163155.33743@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970630111759.13667@bywater.songbird.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

On Mon, Jun 30, 1997 at 04:25:17PM +0000, Paul Bradley wrote:
> > juicy, but just as viable.  And Nazi Germany is also proof that strong
> > crypto really doesn't do much good when the rubber hoses can be
> > deployed without hinderance.
> Strong crypto you must remember is only part of the solution. The reason 
> for the lack of direct response from the Jews during the holocaust was 
> the "legally elected" 3rd Reichs programme of disarming it`s citizens.

In "the real world" (tm by Kent Crispin), Paul, there isn`t anything
that has a single cause, and chains of causality twist, entertwine,
and extend backward indefinitely.  The lack of a "direct response" --
well, you should be able to think of thirty reasons before breakfast,
if you try. 


> > > >It's amazing how little faith libertarians have in the market system,
> > > >isn't it?  :-)
> > > 
> > > A cheap shot, even taking into account Kent Crispin's shilling for GAK.
> > 
> > Like shooting fish in a barrel, really.  Anyway, you know that I don't
> > favor GAK, so where are you coming from?  All I have ever said is 
> > that there is strong corporate demand for enterprise level key 
> > recovery. 
> For once we agree, CACK (corporate access to corporate keys) is a service 
> that is in demand, and will be more in demand in future. I see no reason 
> for this to involve any government or be a regulated market, a 
> competitive corporate escrow market is the best way to go.

Key recovery, of course, involves a very wide range of possible
implementations, escrow services being only one.  My gripe has been
that cypherpunks (this is an overgeneralization, to be sure) are so
averse to key recovery in any form that good systems are simply not
being developed.  Thus there isn't a healthy, competitive market, and
thus, government and corporate interests are taking the field, by
default.  This is a crying shame.  Key management is one of the basic
problems of cryptography -- arguably the most important outstanding
problem for any practical system today.  As crypto spreads into the
collective consciousness people will likely have many keys.  
Dedicated souls can keep track of several infrequently used 
passphrases, but for most of us it just doesn't work.

Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55