1997-06-21 - fbi+eu mass wiretapping?
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From: “Vladimir Z. Nuri” <vznuri@netcom.com>
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
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From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 1997 13:20:03 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: fbi+eu mass wiretapping?
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Subject: SNET: (fwd) piml] Global telephone tapping system.
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 04:19:01 GMT
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FORWARDED On Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400, "Mark A. Smith"
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To: piml@mars.galstar.com
Subject: piml] Global telephone tapping system.
From: "Mark A. Smith" <msmith01@eng.eds.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
European Union and FBI launch global surveillance system
-------------------
From Statewatch,
25 February 1997,
London, UK
-------------------
"The EU, in cooperation with the FBI of the USA, is launching
a system of global surveillance of communications to combat
"serious crime" and to protect "national security", but to do
this they are creating a system which can monitor everyone
and everything. The EU will be able to trawl the airwaves for
"subversive" thoughts and "dissident" views and, with its
partners, across the globe."
"It seems extraordinary given the concern over the Police
Bill in the UK and the "Clipper chip" in the USA that there
has been no debate over the creation of a global telephone
tapping system initiated by the EU and the USA and supported
by Canada, Australia, Norway and Hong Kong."
"the UK Parliament, like many others in the EU, has been by-
passed in the most blatant way. To claim as the Home
Secretary does that the "Memorandum of Understanding" is "not
a significant document" and to fail to send the main EU
Council Resolution to parliament for scrutiny is quite
extraordinary when the Police Bill - which extends police
surveillance - is going through parliament."
OVERVIEW
EU-FBI: global tapping system
The Council of the European Union and the FBI in Washington,
USA have been cooperating for the past five years on a plan
to introduce a global telecommunications tapping system.
The system takes advantage of the liberalisation of
telecommunications - where private companies are taking over
from national telephone systems - and the replacement of
land/sea based lines and microwave towers by satellite
communications.
Telephone lines are now partly land-based or under sea or via
microwave land-based towers but the new generation of
telecommunications will be totally satellite based.
The EU-FBI initiative notes the demise of:
1. state-owned telephone companies
2. nationally-based telephone systems is concerned about:
3. the problems faced with intercepting "mobile" phones and
encrypted communications and wants to ensure:
4. there is harmonisation of national laws on interception
5. to ensure that telecommunications provider business
cooperate with the police and internal security
6. the equipment produced has standards which can be
intercepted
7. as many countries as possible to sign up and thus create
a de facto global system (through provisions of
equipment etc to third countries)
A related disclosure in a book by Nicky Hager shows that
instead of "suspects" and "targets" the ECHELON system simply
trawls the airwaves for "subversive thoughts" in written form
and increasingly in verbal form.
ECHELON is run under the 1948 UKUSA agreement by the US, UK,
Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
REPORT
The Trevi decision
The first reference to this initiative was at a Trevi
Ministers meeting in December 1991 which decided that:
"a study should be made of the effects of legal,
technical and market developments within the
telecommunications sector on the different
interception possibilities and of what action
should be taken to counter the problems that have
become apparent"
At the meeting of Trevi Ministers in Copenhagen in June 1993
they agreed the text of a "questionnaire on phone tapping"
which was sent to each Member State in July 1993 and to the
new members (Finland, Sweden and Austria) in September 1993
(see below).
EU-FBI linkup
At the first meeting of the new Council of Justice and Home
Affairs Ministers in Brussels on 29-30 November 1993 they
adopted the following Resolution on "the interception of
telecommunications" which speaks for itself and reproduced
here in full:
"COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE INTERCEPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Council:
1. calls upon the expert group to compare the requirements
of the Member States of the Union with those of the FBI;
2. agrees that the requirements of the Member States of the
Union will be conveyed to the third countries which
attended the FBI meeting in Quantico and were mentioned
in the memorandum approved by the Ministers at their
meeting in Copenhagen (Sweden, Norway, Finland
(countries applying for accession to the European
Communities), the USA and Canada) in order to avoid a
discussion based solely on the requirements of the FBI;
3. approves for practical reasons the extension to Hong
Kong, Australia and New Zealand (which attended the FBI
seminar) of the decision on co-operation with third
countries which was taken at the Ministerial meeting in
Copenhagen;
4. hereby decides that informal talks with the above-named
countries may be envisaged: to that end the Presidency
and the expert group might, for example, organize a
meeting with those third countries to exchange
information."
Source: "Interception of communications", report to COREPER,
ENFOPOL 40, 10090/93, Confidential, Brussels, 16.11.93.
Main Resolution on the "lawful interception of
communications"
The draft Resolution on the "lawful interception of
communications", an initiative by the Netherlands (which set
out the "Requirements", see below) was discussed in the K4
Committee in March, April, November and December 1994.
The JHA Council discussed the draft Resolution in March 1994
but it was only formally adopted by "written procedure" (by
telexes to Member States dated 21.12.94, 9.1.95, and 18.1.95:
source Council of the European Union; the last date is after
the Resolution was agreed) on 17 January 1995. The decision
was not published in any form for almost two years - on 4
November 1996 it finally appeared in the Official Journal.
The Resolution has three parts: First, the short Resolution
which says:
"the legally authorised interception of
telecommunications is an important tool for the
protection of national interest, in particular
national security and the investigation of serious
crime."
Second, the "REQUIREMENTS" which place a whole series of
obligations on: network providers, eg: satellite
communications networks; and on service providers, who
provide the equipment for national telecom centres, business,
groups and individuals. And finally, a Glossary of
definitions.
The "Requirements" are based on the needs of "law enforcement
agencies" (defined as "a service authorised by law to carry
out telecommunications interceptions") who "require access to
the entire telecommunications transmitted.. by the
interception subject" (defined as: "Person or persons
identified in the lawful authorisation and whose incoming and
outgoing communications are to be intercepted") who is the
subject of an "interception order" defined as: "An order
placed on a network operator/service provider for assisting a
law enforcement agency with a lawfully authorised
telecommunications interception."
The "law enforcement agencies" are required to be provided
with access not just to the content of a communication, in
whatever, form, but also "associated data", "post-connection"
signals (eg: conference calling or call transfer), all
numbers called, all numbers called by - in both cases even if
a connection is not made - plus "realtime, fulltime
monitoring capability", the location of mobile subscribers,
simultaneous and multiple interceptions "by more than one law
enforcement agency", and "roaming" by mobile phone users
"outside their designated home serving area".
The network operators and service providers are expected to
provide "one or several" permanent "interfaces from which the
intercepted communications can be transmitted to the law
enforcement monitoring facility." And, if they provide
"encoding, compression or encryption" to the customer they
must provide it en clair (decrypted) to the law enforcement
agencies.
Finally, they are obliged to ensure that:
"neither the interception target nor any other
authorised person is aware of any changes made to
fulfil the interception order... [and] to protect
information on which and how many interceptions are
being or have been performed, and not to disclose
information on how interceptions are carried out."
Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful
interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95,
Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95; this report contains the
"Memorandum" with the Resolution adopted on 17 January 1965
attached. The Resolution was published in the Official
Journal on 4.11.96, ref: C 329 pages 1-6.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal Interception of
Telecommunications
The "Memorandum of understanding with third countries" (later
described as the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal
Interception of Telecommunications") was discussed at the K4
Committee in November 1994.
The significance of the "Memorandum" is that it extends the
agreement on the surveillance of telecommunications to non-EU
countries who are being invited to adopt it - and with it the
"Requirements".
The Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the 15 EU
Member States on 23 November 1995 at the meeting of the
Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers.
The contact addresses for signatory countries and for further
information, which confirms the EU-USA link, should be sent
to:
a. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attention:
Information Resource Division, 10 Pennsylvania Avenue,
N.W., Washington D.C. 20535
b. General Secretary of the Council of the European Union,
FAO The President, Rue de la Loi 175, B-1048 Brussels,
Belgium."
The number of signatories to the "Memorandum" is open-ended,
any country can join providing the existing member states
agree.
It invites "participants" because "the possibilities for
intercepting telecommunications are becoming increasingly
threatened" and there is a need to introduce "international
interception standards" and "norms for the telecommunications
industry for carrying out interception orders" in order to
"fight.. organised crime and for the protection of national
security."
The strategy appears to be to first get the "Western world"
(EU, US plus allies) to agree "norms" and "procedures" and
then to sell these products to Third World countries - who
even if they do not agree to "interception orders" will find
their telecommunications monitored by ECHELON (see below) the
minute it hit the airwaves.
Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful
interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95,
Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95.
"not a significant document" - the Home Secretary
The Chair of the Select Committee on the European Communities
in the House of Lords, Lord Tordoff, took up the "Memorandum"
with the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in an exchange of
letters on the Committee~s access to documents for scrutiny.
On the subject of the "Memorandum of Understanding on the
Legal Interception of Telecommunications" Mr Howard told Lord
Tordoff:
"The Memorandum of Understanding is a set of
practical guidelines to third countries on the
lawful interception of telecommunications. It is
NOT A SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT and does not, therefore,
appear to meet the criteria for Parliamentary
scrutiny of Title VI documents." (emphasis added)
It is quite clear from this Briefing that the "Memorandum" is
not an insignificant document concerning as it does a EU-US
plan for global telecommunications surveillance.
The "Memorandum" itself is just two pages. It is the full
text of the "Resolution" attached to it which demonstrates
its full meaning.
However, not only did Mr Howard not think the "Memorandum"
was "a significant document" he also apparently believes the
attached Resolution also insignificant as he did not submit
it to the House of Lords Committee for scrutiny prior to its
adoption in January 1995 or thereafter.
Source: Correspondence with Ministers, 9th Session 1995-96,
HL 74, pages 26-29.
Letter to international standards bodies
In December 1995 COREPER agreed a letter to be sent out to
"international standardisation bodies in the field of
telecommunications" (IEC, ISO and ITU). The letter said:
"Modern telecommunications systems present the risk
of not permitting the lawful interception of
telecommunications if they have not been adapted,
at the standardisation and design stage, to allow
such interception."
These bodies are "invited" to take account of the
requirements of the Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 and
told that Member States would be applying "these requirements
to network operators and providers of services".
The December 1995 letter to international standards bodies
and the publication of the main Resolution in November 1996
in the Official Journal announced to manufacturers of
equipment and service providers that they will be expected to
meet the "Requirements" allowing surveillance for any new
contracts within the EU and via the "Memorandum" that these
standards would also apply to any countries signing up to it
- for example, the USA.
Source: "Draft letter to be sent to the international
standardisation bodies concerning the Council Resolution of
17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of
communications", Council General Secretariat to
COREPER/COUNCIL, ENFOPOL 166, 12798/95, Limite, 14.12.95.
Letter to non EU countries
At its meeting on 28-29 November 1996 the Council of Justice
and Home Affairs Ministers agreed a "draft letter" prepared
by the K4 Committee to "non EU participants in the informal
international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar".
"The letter.. informs you of the wider international support
for the "Requirements" annexed to the Council Resolution.
The Council considers that the lawful monitoring of
telecommunications systems is an important tool in the
prevention and detection of serious crimes and in
safeguarding national security. Mindful of new technological
developments in the field of telecommunications, the Council
adopted the Resolution of 17 January, 1996 laying down
technical Requirements, for the lawful interception of
telecommunications. The Member States of the European Union
have been called upon to apply those Requirements to
telecommunications operators and service providers...
The "Requirements" have been discussed by interception
experts from EU Member States with colleagues from other
countries which are equally concerned to ensure that adequate
technical provision is made for legally authorized
interception in modern telecommunications technologies.
Arising from those discussions which have taken place during
a seminar, the Council of the European Union has received
expressions of support for the Requirements from Australia,
Canada, Norway and the United States of America. In
particular, the relevant authorities In those countries have
undertaken to (i) have the Requirements taken into account in
their appropriate national policies and (ii) use the
Requirements as a basis for discussions with the
telecommunications industry, standards bodies and
telecommunications operators...
You are invited to take note of this letter for the purpose
of your further discussions with the telecommunications
industry standards bodies and telecommunications operators.
The President, for the Council of the European Union."
Source: "Draft letter to non EU participants in the informal
international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar
regarding the Council Resolution", ENFOPOL 180, 11282/96,
Limite 6.11.96.
Behind the scenes
Behind the formal decisions and letters the various Working
Parties under the K4 Committee were at work on the details.
In January 1995 the Police Cooperation Working Group, which
comes under the K4 Committee, considered a report by the UK
delegation on the problems presented by the next generation
of satellite-based telecommunications systems which should be
able to:
" ~"tag" each individual subscriber in view of a
possibly necessary surveillance activity."
The report said that the new mobile individual communications
working through satellites were already underway and unlike
the current earth-bound systems based on GSM-technology would
"in many cases operate from outside the national territory".
The rationale for the plan was that these new systems:
"will provide unique possibilities for organised
crime and will lead to new threats to national
security".
The report said all the new systems have to have the
capability to place all individuals under surveillance - the
product of "tagging" individual phone lines could therefore
easily be extended to political activists, "suspected"
illegal migrants and others.
The fact that the new systems were being developed by large
private international corporations, not national state-run
systems, created "unusual problems for the legally permitted
surveillance of telecommunications". The first problem to
surface, according to the report, was that:
"initial contacts with various consortia... has met
with the most diverse reactions, ranging from great
willingness to cooperate on the one hand, to an
almost total refusal even to discuss the question."
It goes on to say:
"it is very urgent for governments and/or
legislative institutions to make the new consortia
aware of their duties. The government will also
have to create new regulations for international
cooperation so that the necessary surveillance will
be able to operate."
Another "problem" for surveillance under the new systems is
that satellites will communicate with earth-bound stations
which will function as distribution points for a number of
adjoining countries - there will not be a distribution point
in every country. While the existing "methods of legally
permitted surveillance of immobile and mobile
telecommunications have hitherto depended on national
infrastructures" (italics added). The:
"providers of these new systems do not come under
the legal guidelines used hitherto for a legal
surveillance of telecommunications."
The report says it would be difficult to monitor the "upward
and downward connections to the distribution point" so the
"tag" would start the surveillance at "the first earthbound
distribution point".
Due to the number of different countries that might be
involved in making a connection it has been agreed that the
following "relevant data" should be provided: "the number of
the subscriber calling, the number of the subscriber being
called, the numbers of all subscribers called thereafter".
The report uses the example of a subscriber who is a national
of country A, with a telephone subscription in country B
(supplying the relevant data for the "tag"), who occasionally
uses the system in country C which uses the distribution
point in country D (which conducts the surveillance) and who
is in contact with a person in country E concerning a
suspected serious crime in country F.
The report with a series of recommendations including
amendments to national laws to "ensure that surveillance will
be possible within the new systems" and that "all those who
are involved in planning the new systems" should be made
aware of "the demands of legally permitted surveillance".
A later report from the same Working Party, in June 1995,
concludes:
"These new telecommunications systems have much in
common with existing mobile phone systems... [and]
will very quickly develop into a global problem,
which looks like it can only be controlled by
global cooperation of a hitherto unknown degree."
Sources: "Legally permitted surveillance of
telecommunications systems provided from a point outside the
national territory", report from the UK delegation to the
Working Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/95,
Restricted, 9.1.95; Report from the Presidency to the Working
Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/2/95 REV 2,
Limite, 2.6.95.
Questionnaire on "national law regarding phone tapping"
In November 1995 while the EU Ministers were signing the
"Memorandum of Understanding" for non-EU countries a Working
Party under the K4 Committee was considering a report from
the Spanish delegation on national laws within the EU on
phone tapping surveillance.
The 1995 report opens with the cynical observation:
"As it was foreseeable, all states which have
answered the questionnaire guarantee the
confidentiality of private communications either by
their constitution or their Basic Law, or both, in
accordance with Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights."
However, it goes on to observe, and assume, "under certain
conditions the interception of telecommunications" is
allowed.
The report says the country surveys showed - and this is of
crucial importance regarding surveillance by ECHELON (see
below) that:
"At the moment there does not seem to be a legal
problem for interception that depends on the kind
of device used for the transmission of voice, text,
data or images"
This is a reference to forms of "written" communications or
"images" sent by e-mail, fax, and telex.
It summarises the legal positions as: the following countries
"can simply" make changes in the penal procedure: Germany,
Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal, while
Belgium, France, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Norway and Sweden
require new legislation, with a combination of both in Italy.
Discussions had taken place, the report says, on the "great
advantages" the police have if: "they can keep people under
surveillance on the grounds of suspicion of criminal
activity". Some countries require objective evidence of an
offence before surveillance can start but in Austria a
request for a phone tap "leads automatically to an
investigation being opened".
Another problem addressed was the right of individual's to be
informed about phone tapping (Article 6.3 in relation to
Article 8 of the ECHR):
"Obviously such information prejudices the result
of the police investigation. Therefore, each
country has to arrange for a procedure to legally
delay notification."
The report recommends the Danish system where a lawyer is
appointed by the Justice Ministry who represents the
interests of the person to be placed under surveillance at a
private hearing but is not allowed to tell the person
concerned.
The survey found that the maximum duration of authorisation
varied from 2 weeks to 4 months.
The report concludes that phone tapping "is justified by a
serious offence" where "a punishment of imprisonment of one
year or more" is available to fight "organised crime". Yet
again the justification for combating "organised crime" is so
widely drawn - sentences of just one year or more - that the
purpose of surveillance has to be fundamentally questioned.
Source: "Report on the national laws regarding the
questionnaires on phone tapping", Report from the Spanish
Presidency to the Working Group on Police Cooperation,
ENFOPOL 15, 4354/2/95 REV 2, Restricted, 13.11.95.
Who is going to pay for it?
One issue on which the reports from the K4 Committee are
silent is who is to pay the costs for the special facilities
needed under the "Requirements" of law enforcement agencies -
network and service providers or the governments?
However, a report produced by the German government, says
that the costs are going to be astronomical. It estimates
that to set up surveillance of mobile phones alone will cost
4 billion D-Marks.
Source: draft report, dated 5 May 1995, from the German
government on the "problems and solutions regarding the
surveillance of telecommunications".
The "ECHELON" connection
"ECHELON" is a world-wide surveillance system designed and
coordinated by the US NSA (National Security Agency) that
intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and international telephone
communications carried via satellites and has been operating
since the early 1980s - it is part of the post Cold War
developments based on the UKUSA agreement signed between the
UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948.
The five agencies involved are: the US National Security
Agency (NSA), the Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB) in New Zealand, Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) in the UK, the Communications Security Establishment
(CSE) in Canada and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in
Australia.
The system has been exposed by Nicky Hager in his 1996 book,
Secret Power: New Zealand's role in the International Spy
Network. He interviewed more than 50 people who work or have
worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of
ECHELON.
"The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on
a particular individual's e-mail or fax link.
Rather, the system works by indiscriminately
intercepting very large quantities of
communications and using computers to identify and
extract messages from the mass of unwanted ones."
There are three components to ECHELON:
1. The monitoring of Intelsats, international
telecommunications satellites used by phone companies in
most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow
in Cornwall monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the
Indian Ocean.
2. ECHELON interception of non-Intelsat regional
communication satellites. Key monitoring stations are
Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany.
3. The final element of the ECHELON system is the
surveillance of land-based or under-sea systems which
use cables or microwave tower networks.
At present it is thought ECHELON's effort is primarily
directed at the "written form" (e-mails, faxes, and telexes)
but new satellite telephones system which take over from old
land-based ones will be as vulnerable as the "written word".
Each of the five centres supply "Dictionaries" to the other
four of keywords, phrases, people and places to "tag" and the
tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting
country.
It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential
development on phone calls combined with the standardisation
of "tappable" telecommunications centres and equipment being
sponsored by the EU and the USA which presents a truly global
threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls.
Source: "Exposing the global surveillance system", Nicky
Hager. CovertAction Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pages 11-17.
CHRONOLOGY
December 1991
A meeting of the Trevi Ministers decide a study should be
carried out on the new telecommunications systems and "the
different interception possibilities".
29-30 November 1993
The first meeting of the new, post-Maastricht, Council of
Justice and Home Affairs Ministers meeting in Brussels adopt
a Resolution calling on experts to compare the needs of the
EU "with those of the FBI".
March, April, November and December 1994
The K4 Committee discusses the draft Resolution on the lawful
interception of telecommunications and the "Requirements" to
be placed on network and service providers.
March 1994
The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers discuss the
draft Resolution.
November 1994
The K4 Committee discusses the draft "Memorandum of
Understanding with third countries".
9 January 1995
The Working Group on Police Cooperation, under the K4
Committee, considers a report on the need to "tag" all
communications.
17 January 1995
The Resolution is adopted by "written procedure". It is not
published in any form until 4 November 1996 when it appears
in the Official Journal.
13 November 1995
The Working Group on Police Cooperation consider a report on
the situation in each EU state on telephone tapping.
23 November 1995
The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the
"Memorandum of Understanding". It is not published in any
form.
December 1995
COREPER agree the text of a letter to be sent to
international standards bodies attaching the Resolution.
7 May 1996
Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, tells the Chair of the
Select Committee on the European Communities in the House of
Lords that the "Memorandum of Understanding on the legal
interception of communications" is "not a significant
document".
28 November 1996
The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the
text of a letter to be sent out to other potential
"participants" (countries) in the "Memorandum of
Understanding".
Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers
Set up under Title VI, Article K, of the Maastricht Treaty.
First meet on 29 November 1993 when it took over from the
Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration.
K4 Committee
Also set up under the Maastricht Treaty to coordinate the
work on the "third pillar" - policing, immigration and
asylum, and legal cooperation. Is comprised of senior
officials from Interior Ministries and prepares report to go
to the Council.
Under the K4 Committee there are three Steering Groups
covering policing and customs, immigration and asylum, and
legal cooperation (civil and criminal) to which a series of
Working Groups report.
COREPER
The Committee of Permanent Representatives from each EU state
based in Brussels.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright: Statewatch, February 1997. Material in this report may be
used provided the source is acknowledged.
Statewatch, PO Box 1516, London N16 0EW
tel: 00 44 181 802 1882
fax: 00 44 181 880 1727
e-mail: statewatch-off@geo2.poptel.org.uk
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1997-06-21 (Sat, 21 Jun 1997 13:20:03 +0800) - fbi+eu mass wiretapping? - “Vladimir Z. Nuri” <vznuri@netcom.com>