From: Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Jul 1997 22:56:49 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ashcroft Encryption Editorial
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From: Bill GL Stafford <springco@arn.net>
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 I believe these guys are on our side.
 Bill GL Stafford
 <http://www.investors.com/web_edition/today/viewfrontpage.html>http://www
..invest
 ors.com/web_edition/today/viewfrontpage.html
 Encryption: Keep Feds'
 Nose Out Of The Net
 ASHCROFT J.

 Date: 7/11/97

 Edgar Hoover would have loved this. The
 Clinton administration wants government to
 be able to read international computer
 communications - financial transactions,
 personal e-mail and proprietary information
 sent abroad - all in the name of national
 security.

 In a proposal that raises obvious concerns
 about Americans' privacy, President
 Clinton wants to give agencies the keys for
 decoding all exported U.S. software and
 Internet communications. Such a policy also
 would tamper with the competitive
 advantage that our U.S. software
 companies currently enjoy in the field of
 encryption technology.

 Not only would Big Brother be looming over
 the shoulders of international cybersurfers,
 he also threatens to render our
 state-of-the-art computer software
 engineers obsolete and unemployed.

 Granted, the Internet could be used to
 commit crimes, and advanced encryption
 could disguise such activity. However, we
 do not provide the government with phone
 jacks outside our homes for unlimited
 wiretaps. Why, then, should we grant
 government the Orwellian capability to
 listen at will and in real time to our
 communications across the Web?

 The protections of the Fourth Amendment
 are clear. The right to protection from
 unlawful searches is an indivisible
 American value.

 The president has proposed that American
 companies and computer users supply the
 government with decryption keys to
 high-level encryption programs. Yet
 European software producers are free to
 produce computer encryption codes of all
 levels of security without providing keys to
 any government authority.

 Buyers of encryption software value security
 above all else. They will ultimately choose
 airtight encryption programs - not those for
 which the U.S. government maintains keys.

 In spite of this obvious fact, the president is
 trying to foist his rigid policy on the
 exceptionally fluid and fast-paced computer
 industry. Furthermore, recent developments
 in decryption technology cast doubt on the
 wisdom of any government meddling in this
 industry.

 Two weeks ago, the 56-bit algorithm
 government standard encryption code that
 protects most U.S. electronic financial
 transactions, from ATM cards to wire
 transfers, was broken by a low-powered
 90-megahertz Pentium processor.

 In 1977, when this code was first approved
 by the U.S. government as a standard, it
 was deemed unbreakable. And for good
 reason - there are 72 quadrillion different
 combinations in a 56-bit code. However,
 with today's technology, these 72
 quadrillion different combinations can each
 be tried -it's only a matter of time and
 determination.

 Two days after this encryption code was
 broken, however, the Senate Commerce
 Committee voted, in accordance with
 administration policy, to force American
 software companies to perpetuate this
 already compromised 56-bit encryption
 system.

 Meanwhile, 128- bit encryption software
 from European firms is available to every
 Web user. Interestingly, European firms can
 import this supersecure encryption
 technology (originally developed by
 Americans) to the U.S., but U.S. companies
 are forbidden by law from exporting these
 same programs to other countries.

 So to move forward with the president's
 policy or the Commerce Committee's bill
 would be an act of folly, creating a cadre of
 government peeping Toms and causing
 severe damage to our vibrant software
 industries. Government would be caught in
 a perpetual game of catch-up with whiz-kid
 code-breakers and industry advances.

 Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., has
 signaled his objection to both proposals.
 He and I would like to work to bring to the
 floor a version of the encryption legislation
 by Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont. Burns' bill
 closely resembles the popular House
 encryption bill sponsored by Rep. Bob
 Goodlatte, R- Va. Both measures would not
 require sharing of keys with the goverment.

 In essence, these proposals would give
 U.S. encryption software manufacturers the
 freedom to compete on equal footing in the
 worldwide marketplace. They would set up
 a quasi-governmental board for the industry
 to decide encryption bit strength based on
 the current level of international technology.

 U.S. companies are on the front line of
 online technologies - the value- added
 industries of the future.

 The best policy for encryption technology is
 one that can rapidly react to breakthroughs
 in decoding capability and roll back
 encryption limits as needed. The Burns and
 Goodlatte proposals would accomplish this.
 In contrast, the Clinton administration's
 unnecessary and invasive interest in
 international e-mail is a wholly unhealthy
 precedent, especially given this
 administration's track record on FBI files
 and Internal Revenue Service snooping.

 Every medium by which people
 communicate can be exploited by those
 with illegal or immoral intentions.
 Nevertheless, this is no reason to hand Big
 Brother the keys to unlock our e-mail
 diaries, open our ATM records or translate
 our international communications.

 John Ashcroft is a Republican U.S. senator
 from Missouri and a member of the Senate
 Commerce Committee.

 (C) Copyright 1997 Investors Business
 Daily, Inc.
 Metadata: E/IBD E/SN1 E/EDIT
 <http://www.investors.com/web_edition/today/viewfrontpage.html>http://www
..invest
 ors.com/web_edition/today/viewfrontpage.html
 --
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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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