From: Antonomasia <ant@notatla.demon.co.uk>
To: cypherpunks@ssz.com
Message Hash: 1063e87395b607c68466514be75d9fcb62660eaf0b569edf89a9b4bb8755fc93
Message ID: <199709292301.AAA04109@notatla.demon.co.uk>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-30 00:24:22 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 08:24:22 +0800
From: Antonomasia <ant@notatla.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 08:24:22 +0800
To: cypherpunks@ssz.com
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: Quor's cypher
Message-ID: <199709292301.AAA04109@notatla.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
nobody@REPLAY.COM: (21 Sep 1997)
> This is a really nifty encryption program. It runs about half the speed
> of rc4, but seems much more secure.
>
> --- Forwarded Message:
>
> From: quor@nym.alias.net
> Subject: Re: tell me what you think of this...
>
> [snip]
>
> /* Qcypher.c */
>
> [snip]
Has anybody got anything good against this ? I can get about
1/32 of the state with a simple form of differential cryptanalysis,
but can't see how to progress it beyond that.
My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition.
ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp
ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc
When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test
whether they have the same value of a and b.
(That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.)
This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap.
What I really want next is to know "a".
Because c is always known (it's only a counter) if you always knew
"a" you'd have a handle on "b" because only 2 (predictable) elements of
the state array change with each byte encrypted.
--
##############################################################
# Antonomasia ant@notatla.demon.co.uk #
# See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ #
##############################################################
Return to October 1997
Return to “nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)”