1997-09-04 - Re: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls (fwd)

Header Data

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Message Hash: 110622e73da8c49f9d622c5eadd78e2d1c74be014a9805b8484dfc009d1a8250
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9709031718.A18984-0100000@netcom2>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-04 00:46:10 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 4 Sep 1997 08:46:10 +0800

Raw message

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 1997 08:46:10 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: Re: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9709031718.A18984-0100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sometimes these guys can still surprise even me. That statement below is 
about as blatant as it gets:

[Freeh]
There are a number of ways that that could be
implemented, but what we believe we need as a minimum
is a feature implemented and designed by the
manufacturers of the products and services here that
will allow law enforcement to have an immediate lawful
decryption of the communications in transit or the
stored data.  That could be done in a mandatory
manner.  It could be done in an involuntary manner.
But the key is that we have the ability.
--------------------------------------------------------------


Let me get this straight: they need *as a minimum* instant access to all 
cleartext. So what is the "more than minimum" they truly desire?

And the two alternatives Freeh proposes to obtain this *minimum* are 
either "mandatory" or "involuntary". What a choice!

--Lucky






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