1997-09-28 - engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)

Header Data

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
To: holovacs@idt.net
Message Hash: 4dcf448c311683fda23ced96ccc0876a6488f4d1eb97d22ebc2984affec8f978
Message ID: <199709272356.AAA00422@server.test.net>
Reply To: <199709262107.RAA17847@u1.farm.idt.net>
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-28 00:31:15 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 08:31:15 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 08:31:15 +0800
To: holovacs@idt.net
Subject: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
In-Reply-To: <199709262107.RAA17847@u1.farm.idt.net>
Message-ID: <199709272356.AAA00422@server.test.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Jay Holovacs <holovacs@idt.net> writes:
> [dangers of horseman spin or reichstag fire tatics from Free & gang]
> 
> On the other hand a publicized security disaster or "infowar" attack
> could spin things in the other direction.

Reckon cypherpunks can knock up a few of those.

So lets here some ideas for good photogenic infowar attacks which show
that the lack of crypto is dangerous.

Stuff internet protocols at low level (say DNS) due to lack of crypto
and too centralised design?  We could do that I think.  The guy from
alternic rigged DNS root to point at him, we could rig it to point to
zip.

In the clear or poorly ciphered banking protocols (say private leased
lines).

etc.

Adam
-- 
Now officially an EAR violation...
Have *you* violated EAR today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

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)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`






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