1997-09-28 - RE: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)

Header Data

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
To: “‘Adam Back’” <holovacs@idt.net>
Message Hash: 911b756232fcc9a8f5fb3d89d0feccc889344156d398dee873b2fde402e23db0
Message ID: <01BCCBA7.0FB66580.hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-28 05:01:40 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 13:01:40 +0800

Raw message

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 13:01:40 +0800
To: "'Adam Back'" <holovacs@idt.net>
Subject: RE: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
Message-ID: <01BCCBA7.0FB66580.hallam@ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Saturday, September 27, 1997 7:57 PM, Adam Back [SMTP:aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk] wrote:

> Reckon cypherpunks can knock up a few of those.
> 
> So lets here some ideas for good photogenic infowar attacks which show
> that the lack of crypto is dangerous.

I suggest unless people want to hand the FBI an excuse
to harass everyone that they don't enter into this discussion.

There are plenty of conspiracy laws on the book. Infrastructure
attacks are illegal and exactly the kind of thing that gets long
jail sentences.

More to the point it is completely counterproductive. Even now 
there is probably some FBI junior waving Back's message in
the air as if he has won the pools, probable cause for wiretaps
I would say.

I suspect I'm not the only person on the list who is responsible 
for a service that is a regular hacker target. If I catch someone I 
really don't care what the motive for the attack was. I'm going to
look to make that person serve jail time.


		Phill






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