From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>
Message Hash: 9e6488142c270408c0169495ac683ed511648d8d59f0ab5b3bd3a89b90c4e7ac
Message ID: <v03007809b05099a2e7c7@[168.161.105.141]>
Reply To: <19970925193213.21630.qmail@hotmail.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-25 23:05:57 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 26 Sep 1997 07:05:57 +0800
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 1997 07:05:57 +0800
To: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>
Subject: Why no version of SAFE removes export ctrls, and all are dangerous
In-Reply-To: <19970925193213.21630.qmail@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <v03007809b05099a2e7c7@[168.161.105.141]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tim writes below that SAFE doesn't get rid of export controls. That's true,
even before it's compromised to death. I've attached below my column on
SAFE I wrote in June...
This is just one reason why no new laws are better than bad new laws.
-Declan
***************
At 14:17 -0700 9/25/97, Tim May wrote:
>At 12:32 PM -0700 9/25/97, J. Random Hotmail User wrote:
>
>>Without the export restrictions we would see much more crypto sold
>>and used inside the US. I'll bet there are lots of cypherpunks who
>>are holding off releasing crypto tools because of these laws. Look
>>at the guy who said he had to go to Canada to release his crypto.
>>And he had to stop thinking about it when he was in the US. This
>>is crazy.
>
>Yes, it's crazy, but SAFE doesn't fix this in any meaningful way.
>
>We can ask Ian Goldberg, the guy you refer to, if the enactment of SAFE
>would cause him to develop software in the U.S. Remember, SAFE does not
>give carte blanche to crypto exports. Rather, it speaks of whether or not
>similar products already can be found elsewhere (thus indicating export
>review will happen, with all that that implies) and it further gives
>authority to deny exports if "substantial evidence" exists that the product
>is or could be used by the Bad Guys for Evil Puposes. (Cf. the full text of
>H.R. 695 at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/hr695_text.html, and
>remember that amendments are being added to it.)
>
>This latter authority to block exports suggests NSA/State vetting of all
>exports. Meaning, things really haven't changed.
>
>All it would take is a letter stating that there is "substantial evidence"
>that Ian's product may be "diverted" for use by those the U.S. doesn't
>like.
>
>Well, duh, we're where we are today on exports.
>
>So, will Ian, or C2Net, or others, launch software development here and
>just sort of hope that when the time comes to apply for an export license
>that the conditions above are met? First, that the BXA/NSA/etc. rules that
>similar products are already available. Second, that the product will not
>be used by Hamas, a group the U.S. calls a terrorist group, or the Cali
>Cartel, or the Irish Republican Army, or the armies of Iraq? Think about
>it, given that Hamas is already using PGP 5.0 to fight the Zionist
>occupiers in Palestine.
>
>Would PGP 5.0 receive an export license? Even under SAFE?
>
>Would a product designed to implement Chaumian untraceable cash, a la some
>of the work on Lucre and the like, receive export approval? Even under SAFE?
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1022,00.html
The Netly News Network
June 5, 1997
Mr. Gates Goes to Washington
by Declan McCullagh (declan@well.com)
For Siliconaires like Bill Gates of Microsoft, Eric
Schmidt of Novell and Jeff Papows of Lotus, Washington
is a city made pleasant by absence. They view its
labyrinthine bureaucracies and hidebound institutions as
something between a minor hindrance and an
insurmountable obstacle to the important business of
making profits, not public policy. So it was no surprise to
see the high-tech trio join seven other executives
yesterday
at the National Press Club to rail against the Clinton
administration's restrictions on overseas sales of
encryption products.
This Billionaire Boys' Club was especially keen on
praising two bills that would generally relax export rules.
"We clearly support the House and the Senate bills that are
on the Hill in their original form. Getting reform done now
is a huge priority for all of us," said one. "There are
bills
in the House and the Senate that are totally
acceptable, and
if those bills are passed they'd solve the problem,"
another
added.
But perhaps Bill Gates should have spent less time
writing BASIC interpreters and more time in civics
classes, because these bills are far from perfect. In fact,
they may be downright dangerous.
"Please, do no harm here. Let's keep what we won,"
says Cindy Cohn, one of the lawyers mounting an
EFF-sponsored court challenge to the White House's
export rules. So far that effort has been successful: A
federal judge ruled last December that the line-by-line
instructions in a computer program are "speech" and
restrictions on overseas shipments violate the First
Amendment.
Cohn argues that both Rep. Bob Goodlatte's (R-Va.)
SAFE bill and Sen. Conrad Burns' (R-Mont.) ProCODE
bill could do more harm than good. She says they might
not even help her client, a university professor who wants
to discuss encryption without going to jail. "What effect
would SAFE or ProCODE have? Either none or a
detrimental one," Cohn said on Monday at a conference
organized by the Electronic Privacy Information Center.
(A Burns spokesperson responded by saying any
problems could be addressed after the bill leaves the
Commerce Committee and moves to the Senate floor.)
This might seem like a lot of high-powered debate
over an obscure subject, but the argument boils down to a
conflict between pragmatism and principle. Will Congress
decide to help out Bill Gates at our expense? Sure,
removing export controls completely would benefit
everyone, but SAFE doesn't go that far: Only software
"that is generally available" overseas may be exported.
Which means if I invent a new data-scrambling method
that nobody overseas has developed, I'm screwed. SAFE
also creates a new federal felony if you use crypto in a
crime. Cypherpunks have criticized the measure, saying
that when crypto starts to appear in products from light
switches to doorknobs, Congress might as well put you in
jail if you breathe while committing a crime. Then there's
ProCODE, which sets up a new federal
crypto-bureaucracy -- hardly a reassuring thought.
[...]
some veteran Washington lawyers
warn that the proposals in Congress will not nullify the
export rules. "Because the language of the SAFE act
doesn't track the language of the executive order and the
[Commerce Department regulations], which of course they
couldn't anticipate, there's substantial wiggle room
left for
the government to maintain some controls. The bills may
not have the desired effect in the long run," says Roszel
Thomsen, a partner at the Thomsen and Burke law firm.
"There's room for someone to completely rewrite a
bill that starts from the provision that all source code is
speech -- then squarely roll back the most onerous
provisions from the administration's executive order last
November and track the current laws to eliminate the
wiggle room," Thomsen says. "But I don't think there's
the willpower to do that."
If that willpower doesn't exist, then perhaps
Congress shouldn't pass either SAFE or ProCODE. No
legislation is better than bad law, especially when court
challenges are moving forward -- and don't bring with
them nasty side effects. We shouldn't have to give up
some freedoms to gain others. If Congress doesn't have
the courage to do the right thing, it's better they do
nothing
-- even if Bill Gates prefers otherwise.
[...]
-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/
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