From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: ddd180376d3fc2cab53972b6906acc7946d331769d38a734160705c1ea7e0ef7
Message ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970909090126.24823C-100000@well.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-09 16:23:27 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 10 Sep 1997 00:23:27 +0800
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 1997 00:23:27 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We're not surprised
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970909090126.24823C-100000@well.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 1997 09:01:09 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: We're not surprised
---
http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/
FOR RELEASE: August 16, 1995, 2:00 p.m. EST
J
WASHINGTON, DC - Newly-released government documents show
that key federal agencies concluded more than two years ago that
the "Clipper Chip" encryption initiative will only succeed if
alternative security techniques are outlawed. The Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) obtained the documents from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Information
Act. EPIC, a non-profit research group, received hundreds of
pages of material from FBI files concerning Clipper and
cryptography.
J
Clipper, and its underlying key-escrow encryption technology,
are designed to guarantee government agents "real-time" access to
encrypted communications. This is accomplished by placing an
extra set of decryption "keys" in the hands of designated "escrow
agents."
J
The conclusions contained in the documents appear to conflict
with frequent Administration claims that use of Clipper technology
will remain "voluntary." Critics of the government's initiative,
including EPIC, have long maintained that the Clipper "key-escrow
encryption" technique would only serve its stated purpose if made
mandatory. According to the FBI documents, that view is shared by
the Bureau, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
In a "briefing document" titled "Encryption: The Threat,
Applications and Potential Solutions," and sent to the National
Security Council in February 1993, the FBI, NSA and DOJ concluded
that:
J
Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if
they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.
To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the
use of Government-approved encryption products or
adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.
J
Likewise, an undated FBI report titled "Impact of Emerging
Telecommunications Technologies on Law Enforcement" observes that
"[a]lthough the export of encryption products by the United States
is controlled, domestic use is not regulated." The report
concludes that "a national policy embodied in legislation is
needed." Such a policy, according to the FBI, must ensure "real-
time decryption by law enforcement" and "prohibit[] cryptography
that cannot meet the Government standard."
J
The FBI conclusions stand in stark contrast to public
assurances that the government does not intend to prohibit the use
of non-escrowed encryption. Testifying before a Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann
Harris asserted that:
J
As the Administration has made clear on a number of
occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a
voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of
mandating private use of a particular kind of
cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of
certain kinds of cryptography.
J
According to EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, the newly-
disclosed information "demonstrates that the architects of the
Clipper program -- NSA and the FBI -- have always recognized that
key-escrow must eventually be mandated. As privacy advocates and
industry have always said, Clipper does nothing for law
enforcement unless the alternatives are outlawed."
J
Scanned images of several key documents are available via the
World Wide Web at the EPIC Home Page:
J
http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/
J
J
J
-30-
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