1997-09-13 - key escrow B.S. “cure” for single point of failure

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From: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <mix@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f351071be6a45eb6faecaeb56b90543d5dd122e301315d8b92b08b8c637517b1
Message ID: <19970913032000.1993.qmail@nym.alias.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-13 03:29:36 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 13 Sep 1997 11:29:36 +0800

Raw message

From: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <mix@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 1997 11:29:36 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: key escrow B.S. "cure" for single point of failure
Message-ID: <19970913032000.1993.qmail@nym.alias.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




The feds say that key escrow is not a single point of failure,
because private keys will be split between arms of the bureaucracy,
and an attacker would have to con three or more independent
agencies or agents to gain access to a key.

Now, running buffer overflows on three machines with dialup accounts
paid for with stolen credit cards and hooked through the payphone in
Cloyne hall seems just as easy as running buffer overflows on one.

Single point may be worse than three points, but one and three seem
almost the same when compared to 250,000,000.

-THE LIE






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