From: Kent Crispin <kent@bywater.songbird.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 23:54:20 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: PGP Employee on MKR
In-Reply-To: <877698834.17691.193.133.230.33@unicorn.com>
Message-ID: <19971024084128.07044@bywater.songbird.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Fri, Oct 24, 1997 at 06:13:55AM -0700, mark@unicorn.com wrote:
> whgiii@invweb.net wrote:
> 
> > No their system does not. For what the FBI and NSA want much more needs to
> > be done.
> 
> Really? Read the message I sent after that one. Let's suppose it's 2007,
> PGP have 99% of the crypto market. 
[...]

Probabilty: 0% 
Next argument:

> Here's a quick example of how cool CMR is... let's suppose that 
> loser@foo-bah.com upsets a customer and is working for a CMR corporation.
> Mr Irate Customer downloads some of that kiddie porn that we're told is
> all over the Net, and encrypts it to loser@foo-bah.com, but doesn't
> encrypt it to the company key. Mr Irate Customer mails hundreds of these
> images to loser@foo-bah.com. Their system bounces them. The security
> personnel at foo-bah.com notice all these bounces and snarf some of the
> messages.
> 
> The security personell take these messages to Mr Loser, and force him to
> decrypt them. Shock, horror, what a hideous, insane pervert Mr Loser must
> be to be receiving all these messages. Mr Loser is handed over to the cops
> and taken away. He might not go to jail, but he'll lose his job.
> 
> With a more rational implementation Mr Loser would receive the messages
> and see that they're obscene, and immediately report them to the security
> personnel who could track down the sender. But when the security personnel
> find them first, they immediately assume that Mr Loser asked for them.

Words fail me.  This is completely idiotic.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html