From: Roger Schlafly <schlafly@mail.cruzio.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 1997 04:02:04 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: Freeh letter to NYT
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19971017124121.0069d8d0@mail.cruzio.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[From www.nytimes.com, Oct. 16, 1997]

To the Editor:

"An Attack on Privacy Rights"
(editorial, Oct. 3)
argues that the approach to encryption that the law enforcement
community is advocating has somehow "put the need to eavesdrop
on criminals above the privacy rights of ordinary Americans."
Nothing could be further from the truth.

You fail to mention that the same court-ordered, judicially
approved procedures that now apply to wiretaps and electronic
data searches would also apply to our ability to obtain
decryption keys or information.

In fact, what we proposed requires two orders from a judge
before we proceed, not just one as now required.

There is another issue that, if unaddressed, will have public
safety ramifications. Encryption that cannot be deciphered
regardless of the number of court orders or new technologies
obtained by the police will devastate our ability to fight crime
and prevent terrorism. It will nullify the ability to carry out
court-authorized searches and seizures of criminal communication
and electronic evidence.

Policy decisions about encryption should not be left solely to
market forces. Congress, the computer industry and law
enforcement can work together to craft legislation that
balances the public safety with the commercial and private needs
of law-abiding Americans. We are not wedded to any particular
solution, but feel that some workable solution can be found to
insure that law enforcement can gain immediate access to the
plaintext of encrypted criminal communication or electronic data
that we have lawfully seized.

LOUIS J. FREEH
Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, Oct. 10, 1997

----------------------------------------------------------------

How can he say this with a straight face?

>In fact, what we proposed requires two orders from a judge
>before we proceed, not just one as now required.

The DOJ proposal, sect 302, says:

  (A)  A Key Recovery Agent, whether or not registered by the Secretary 
  under this Act, shall disclose recovery information stored by a person:
     (1)  ...; or
     (2)  to a law enforcement or national security government agency
     upon receipt of written authorization in a form to be specified by
     the Attorney General.

It also contradicts his final sentence:

>... some workable solution can be found to insure that law enforcement can
>gain immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted criminal communication
>or electronic data that we have lawfully seized.

The term "immediate access" means without having to goto a judge.

Roger