1997-10-13 - Re: CMR paves the road to GAK, and provides no corporate security.

Header Data

From: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
To: Trei Family <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e7e83676b70230da28ab4aee71bd4d5b1395f6eb1af72be06892b12bb1866a63
Message ID: <v03007804b06772d92662@[207.94.249.103]>
Reply To: <3.0.1.32.19971012005421.007ab570@pop3.ziplink.net>
UTC Datetime: 1997-10-13 07:02:04 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 15:02:04 +0800

Raw message

From: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 15:02:04 +0800
To: Trei Family <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CMR paves the road to GAK, and provides no corporate security.
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971012005421.007ab570@pop3.ziplink.net>
Message-ID: <v03007804b06772d92662@[207.94.249.103]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At 9:54 PM -0700 10/11/97, Trei Family wrote:
>Classified agencies know this. In the classified world, there is a huge effort
>to protect data from outside attack. There is a similarly intense effort to
>check that only loyal, reliable, trustworthy people get clearances, and
>strong 'need to know' controls to restrict what data even they can see.
>However,
>once a cleared person has acheived properly authorized access to classified
>data, there is (in my observation) remarkably little done to prevent them
>from deliberately walking off with it.

There's damn little you can do in a free society.  KeyKOS provided a
facility where you could give information to a program and ensure it could
not communicate it elsewhere.  However this facility involved running the
program in what amounted to solitary confinement.  While you can get away
to doing this to programs, people are (rightfully) different.


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