1997-10-29 - John Young–NWO Schill / Re: EU E-Commerce Report

Header Data

From: Yoshiwara Remailer <yr@dev.null>
To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Message Hash: efbce268a320d0fe49b8209a2882e607be29b46bda11ebeab730d16c8190eadd
Message ID: <3457BD4D.534D@dev.null>
Reply To: <>
UTC Datetime: 1997-10-29 23:17:27 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 30 Oct 1997 07:17:27 +0800

Raw message

From: Yoshiwara Remailer <yr@dev.null>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 1997 07:17:27 +0800
To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Subject: John Young--NWO Schill / Re: EU E-Commerce Report
In-Reply-To: <>
Message-ID: <3457BD4D.534D@dev.null>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Young wrote:
> The EU-based Global Internet Project has published a new
> report on electronic commerce:
>    http://jya.com/gip-ecomm.htm  (29K)
> An excerpt on crypto policy:
> 1.No nation's cryptography policy can stand alone.
> 2. Immediate steps should be taken to solve pressing
> cryptographic needs that directly affect the global Internet.
> 3. Reliable and international systems for authentication
> and integrity should be established.

  John Young, New World Order Schill (secret member of the New
World Order of Schills), has cleverly and deceptively given us
a pointer to the 'official release' version of the GIP report
on electronic commerce, in which point #4 purports to be:
> 4. Governments and industry must respond to legitimate user
> concerns.

  In the triple-secret *real* GIP report, as JYA knows, point #4
is as follows:
"4. No one shall buy or sell unless they have the digital implant
of the New World Order in their right hand, or in their foreheads."

> 5. Users should be permitted to decide whether and the degree
> to which key escrow, trusted third party, or key recovery
> technologies will be desirable in their environments or not.
> 6. Trade barriers should not be disguised as cryptographic
> regulations.
> 7. Export controls on encryption should be made multilateral
> in practice and when used, focused narrowly and genuinely on
> national security threats. They should not be used as indirect
> domestic controls.
> 8. Governments should establish and publish the process by
> which keys will be obtained for government purposes. This
> process should include independent judicial review, time limits
> on access, reasonable notice to the key owner when this would
> not interfere with the purposes of the decryption, and
> opportunities for independent audit of compliance with legal
> process.
> 9. Liability for misuse of escrowed keys should be the subject
> of international understanding.
> 10. When key recovery is voluntarily chosen by the user,
> self-retention of key recovery information should be encouraged.