1997-11-12 - Re: SET

Header Data

From: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
To: whgiii@invweb.net (William H. Geiger III)
Message Hash: 04f15e48e843ca99ff18beb4a422f1b18bc06796fdad3c193834d282aea6ad6e
Message ID: <199711121902.LAA02041@slack.lne.com>
Reply To: <199711121845.NAA31064@users.invweb.net>
UTC Datetime: 1997-11-12 19:14:12 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 03:14:12 +0800

Raw message

From: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 03:14:12 +0800
To: whgiii@invweb.net (William H. Geiger III)
Subject: Re: SET
In-Reply-To: <199711121845.NAA31064@users.invweb.net>
Message-ID: <199711121902.LAA02041@slack.lne.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

William H. Geiger III writes:
> In <199711121751.JAA01757@slack.lne.com>, on 11/12/97
>    at 09:51 AM, Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com> said:
> >[details: according to the spec the cardholder sends to the merchant
> >thumbs (SHA1 hashes) of all the certs in the cardholder's cert cache.
> >Since this will contain certs from merchants the cardholder has made
> >purchases from in the past, a merchant could simply match up those
> >merchant cert thumbs with cert thumbs he obtains from other merchants,
> >allowing him to build a list of merchants the cardholder has attempted to
> >make purchases from].
> Sorry I haven't been keeping track of the SET but why would a merchant
> need this info in the first place??? If anything one would think that this
> would be client driven not server driven (ie the client queries the
> merchant for the hash of his cert to see if the client already has a copy
> or not). I am not quite sure what they are trying to accomplish by this
> unless what you consider a "flaw" is realy a "feature by design"?

Sending them all from the client is bit more efficient-
this way the client sends one message with all its thumbs and
the merchant side sends back any certs that are required.

The other way, the merchant would send the thumbs for all
the required certs, then the client would send a list of thumbs
for certs it doesn't have, then the server would send those certs.

So this way there's one less round trip required.

Both methods are equally open to attack unless the list of thumbs is MAC'd.

Eric Murray  Chief Security Scientist  N*Able Technologies  www.nabletech.com
(email:  ericm  at  lne.com   or   nabletech.com)          PGP keyid:E03F65E5