1997-11-22 - SMTP forgeries

Header Data

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Message Hash: 7717b0a21351d79588bda115a95f23ab5e614dbedff04c041163f0b4100cfef5
Message ID: <199711201948.TAA01894@server.test.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-11-22 03:12:35 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:12:35 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:12:35 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: SMTP forgeries
Message-ID: <199711201948.TAA01894@server.test.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




What is the state of the art with SMTP mail forgeries?

It seems that the forwarding SMTP agent can determine the senders IP
address.

I am wondering if this could be prevented by using IP level spoofing
to put fake return IP address on the TCP/IP connection to the
receiving mail hubs SMTP port, in that the sender does not really need
the information the SMTP hup sends back.

This would then be a variant of the IP spoof attack.  What would be
needed would be a site which blindly accepted the one sided traffic
from the receiving SMTP hub where it thought it was replying to the
traffic.

eg. Sender says:

HELO nsa.gov
250 locahost Hello locahost [127.0.0.1], pleased to meet you

The sendmail seems to be trying to be clever doing a reverse name
lookup, and ignoring what you tell it on the HELO line.
The 250 reply is not required by the sender.

MAIL FROM: nobody@nsa.gov
250 nobody@nsa.gov... Sender ok

RCPT TO: joe@acme.com
250 joe@acme.com... Recipient ok

DATA
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
asdfasdfasdf






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