From: Jeremey Barrett <jeremey@bluemoney.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 08:03:39 +0800
To: John Deters <jad@dsddhc.com>
Subject: Re: SET
In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19971112165216.00990790@labg30>
Message-ID: <199711122359.PAA21389@einstein.bluemoney.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



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John Deters writes:
 > At 11:18 AM 11/12/97 -0800, Jeremey Barrett you wrote:
 > >Perhaps... OTOH, SET is SO bad that it will be impossible to deploy,
 > >probably forcing everyone away from it anyway.
 > 
 > Having spent the last ten years at this retail outfit, I can assure you
 > that "impossible to deploy" != "won't be deployed".  If Mastercard tells us
 > that they will jack our rates by 0.5% for every transaction processed
 > without SET, then management will demand SET be rolled out.  Function be
 > damned, security be damned, as long as some bookkeeper somewhere is
 > satisfied that SET happens, then we avoid a huge rate increase.

I don't doubt that... but when they get zero orders because _noone_
has a SET wallet much less SET certs for their cards, that decision
will get re-evaluated pretty quickly (I would think). If the consumer 
has to get out of their chair to use SET, it's dead. And they have to 
do considerably more than that IMO.

The infrastructure required for SET to actually be used is outrageous,
especially for the consumer. All IMHO of course.

 > 
 > If the security of SET is questioned in the trade rags, our management's
 > approach will be to assume that Mastercard will fix it in the future, but
 > roll it out now anyway.  OTOH, it's obvious (even to them) that SET
 > couldn't possibly be any *less* secure than current authorizing techniques.
 > 

True enough...

Regards,
Jeremey.
- -- 
Jeremey Barrett                                BlueMoney Software Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems               http://www.bluemoney.com/
PGP key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64

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