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To: cypherpunks@toad.com
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UTC Datetime: 1997-12-28 19:54:09 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 29 Dec 1997 03:54:09 +0800
From: Anonymous <nobody@REPLAY.COM>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 1997 03:54:09 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY Times on history of public key crypto
Message-ID: <199712281935.UAA12513@basement.replay.com>
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By PETER WAYNER
T o the list of institutions that Tony Blair's Labor Party is shaking
up, add the British Secret Service. Last week, the British
government's eavesdropping organization known as the Government
Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, posted a document to its Web
site describing its role in the discovery of public key cryptography.
The set of algorithms, equations and arcane mathematics that make up
public key cryptography are a crucial technology for preserving
computer privacy in and making commerce possible on the Internet. Some
hail its discovery as one of the most important accomplishments of
20th-century mathematics because it allows two people to set up a
secure phone call without meeting beforehand. Without it, there would
be no privacy in cyberspace.
The move by the once dusty and secretive organization is clearly an
attempt to recast its image as a pioneering leader of cyberspace.
For the last 20 years, the public gave credit for the discovery to
Martin Hellman, a professor at Stanford University, and two graduate
students who worked with him at the time, Ralph Merkle and Whitfield
Diffie. They started publishing their work in 1976.
Three professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the
time, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman soon followed with
another similar approach known by their initials, RSA, which went on
to become one of the dominant solutions used on the Internet.
Before public key cryptography, anyone who wanted to use a secret code
needed to arrange for both sides to have a copy of the key used to
scramble the data, a problem that requires either trusted couriers or
advance meetings. PKC, as it is sometimes known, erased this problem
by making it possible for two people, or more properly their
computers, to agree upon a key by performing some complicated
mathematics. There is no publicly known way for an eavesdropper to
pick up the key by listening in.
T he new document details how three employees of the British
government discovered the same approach several years earlier, but
kept it a secret for reasons of national security. A spokesman for the
British government's GCHQ, said that the document's release is part of
a "pan-governmental drive for openness" pushed by the Labor party.
The document describing the steps of invention taken by the spies was
written by James Ellis, a mathematician and cryptographer who died
less than a month ago. In it, Ellis describes how he suggested the
existence of what he called "non-secret encryption" in 1970s.
Ellis says that Clifford Cocks followed with a more practical solution
in 1973 that was essentially the same thing as the algorithm published
by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The paper also says that Malcolm
Williamson discovered an algorithm in 1974 that was very similar to
the work of Diffie and Hellman. They did not replicate the work done
by Merkle and Hellman.
In a telephone interview from his office in La Jolla, Calif., Malcolm
Williamson said that he felt bad when others discovered the solution,
but concluded, "I was working at the British government and that's
just one of the restrictions you work under when you work for the
government."
Hellman said in a telephone interview that he agrees. "It must be
really difficult for them to watch other people get the credit," he
said. "But that's the agreement they made when they agreed to work in
secret." He was also quick to point out that the secret branches of
the government have the help of large budgets and classified
knowledge.
"Diffie, I and Merkle were working in a vacuum." he said. "If we had
access to all of the classified literature of the previous 30 years,
it would really be an advantage."
For his part, Diffie said in a telephone interview from Cirencester,
England, that he thinks that GCHQ never realized the deep importance
of what the mathematicians discovered. He said that he met James Ellis
several years ago and "within an hour of meeting me, Ellis said, 'You
did much more with this than we did.'"
Diffie also suggested that the history of ideas is hard to write
because many people often find solutions to different problems only to
later determine they've discovered the same thing.
T he story keeps going farther back. Recently, Matt Blaze, a
cryptographer employed at Bell Labs, got a copy of a memorandum from
the desk of John F. Kennedy about the problem of securing nuclear
weapons with launch codes. Steve Bellovin, a colleague of Blaze's at
Bell Labs, said: "When I read this memo, I don't see anything that
would require public key cryptography. But I think they're in the
neighborhood. For so many things, the answer is the easy part. Asking
the question is the hard part. I think this got them asking the
questions."
Historians of science will certainly spend time sorting out the
various claims. David Kahn, the author of the best selling history The
Codebreakers, said that he recently asked the National Security Agency
to declassify some documents so he could write the proper history of
public key cryptography. He said an NSA staff member told him, "I've
spoken to the guys who did this, but they don't want to be interviewed
now." This suggests that the NSA also may have discovered public-key
systems or had a hand in exploring them. Kahn hopes that the NSA will
follow in Britain's lead so an accurate history can be written.
Jim Bidzos, the chief executive of RSA Data Security, the division of
the publicly traded Security Dynamics that holds the patent on the
RSA, said that the announcement in Britain will have no effect on the
company's business. Patent law is based on the notion that the
inventors trade knowledge about the invention in return for an
exclusive license to practice it.
In fact, it is an interesting question to wonder whether Britain could
have changed the history of cyberspace by disclosing the invention and
encouraging the development of widespread cryptographic security for
the public.
This may have been a wise move during the height of the cold war in
the 70's when there were thousands of Soviet tanks poised on the edge
of western Europe. Williamson also hastens to note that mathematical
equations weren't considered patentable in Britain at the time and
without a patent anyone could have used the invention. The RSA patent
in the United States was one of the first and it is generally accepted
to have expanded the definition.
Others are pushing a similar question. In a debate on cryptography
policy at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, John Gilmore,
one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said the
NSA should be more open. While national defense is very valuable, he
suggested that the need for security in cyberspace for all citizens is
going to be essential in the future.
In the long run, the history of the discovery of public key
cryptography is certain to be written and rewritten often in the next
several years as more documents emerge from secret government
laboratories. The spokesman from GCHQ promises that more documents are
on the way.
Hellman is philosophical. "In a way, these things are like gold
nuggets that God left in the forest." he said. "If I'm walking along
in the forest and I stubbed my toe on it, who's to say I deserve
credit for discovering it?"
He is quick to point out, however, that he shared the discovery with
everyone.
_________________________________________________________________
Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company
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1997-12-28 (Mon, 29 Dec 1997 03:54:09 +0800) - NY Times on history of public key crypto - Anonymous <nobody@REPLAY.COM>