From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
To: kalliste@aci.net>
Message Hash: 85af089918b856bc21d6fbadee899970a105cdf6e18ffe5b3b50268d4b95d6fc
Message ID: <34D7287E.1752@nmol.com>
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UTC Datetime: 1998-02-03 14:47:32 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 3 Feb 1998 22:47:32 +0800
From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 1998 22:47:32 +0800
To: kalliste@aci.net>
Subject: Gilbert Vernam
Message-ID: <34D7287E.1752@nmol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tuesday 2/3/98 7:02 AM
John Young
J Orlin Grabbe
The crypto problem was solved in 1918. Vernam and Maugborne [sp?]
did the work.
Gilbert Vernam in 1918. Vernam used two tapes of random characters to
generate the additional characters. With the same tapes at each end set
to the same start position this system was unbreakable. The Germans
decided that the distribution of these key tapes presented too great an
operational problem and the Lorenz machine uses a complicated
mechanical gearing and cam system to generate a pseudo random sequence
with very long period and 10^19 complexity. They thought this
was good enough to ensure unbreakability, it wasn't!
Fushimi's implementation of Lewis and my GFSR algorithm has
period of 2^521 - 1. And LOTS of possible starting seeds.
John Young kindly posted my article on putting non-singular binary
matrices in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers.
Although the period of a shift register can be 2^521 - 1, 521 bits
determines THE EXACT SEQUENCE of the remaining 2^521 - 522 bits.
Pseudorandom numbers generators have an easier job than bits
used for cryptography.
Pseudorandom number generators merely have to deceive statistical
tests.
Orlin Recall the GIANT radio transmitter in the south of Russia,
perhaps Baku.
I heard on PBS TV that it was transmitting a shift register sequence.
The
Russians were apparently trying to communicate with underwater
submarines.
NSA crypto algorithms mostly rely on shift register sequences - both
linear and NON-LINEAR. The R register in my SAND report posted at
jya.com implements a non-linear SECRET/NSI feedback algorithm.
Perhaps someone may have to put NSA's SECRET/NSI R register non-linear
feedback function out on the web some time.
So that every one can have a good laugh, of course. Like for the
SECRET/NSI
number 31 algorithm step.
John Young Judge Svet made a ruling. I sent a copy
to you by snail mail.
Later,
bill
Title: Colossus Rebuild
The Colossus Rebuild Project
by Anthony E Sale, FBCS
A bit of History
Colossus was designed and built at the Post Office Research
Laboratories at Dollis Hill in North London in 1943 by a team led by Dr
Tommy Flowers to help Bletchley Park in decoding the intercepted German
telegraphic cipher traffic enciphered using the Lorenz SZ42 cipher
machine.
Lorenz SZ42 cipher machine at Bletchley Park
This cipher machine enciphered electrical teleprinter signals which
used the international 5 bit Baudot teleprinter code. It enciphered the
input plain text by adding to it successively two characters before
transmission. Because this addition was bit by bit modulo 2, at the
receiving end with the Lorenz machine set to the same start position,
the same two characters were added again to the received characters
revealing the original plain text.
This scheme had been developed in
America by Gilbert Vernam in 1918. Vernam used two tapes of random
characters to generate the additional characters. With the same tapes at
each end set to the same start position this system was unbreakable. The
Germans decided that the distribution of these key tapes presented too
great an operational problem and the Lorenz machine uses a complicated
mechanical gearing and cam system to generate a pseudo random sequence
with very long period and 10^19 complexity. They thought this was good
enough to ensure unbreakability, it wasn't!
A bibliography of works discussing the Lorenz
cipher has been compiled by
Frode Weierud is availabe here by
permission. As is a book chapter describing the
Swedish effort to crack Lorenz.
The German high command thought that the Lorenz machine was
completely unbreakable and used it for their most secret messages,
literally from Hitler to his generals and between generals. The
interception and deciphering of these messages gave Generals Eisenhower
and Montgomery vital information prior to and after D Day in 1944.
Colossus was the world's first large electronic valve programmable
logic calculator, not just one but ten of them were built and
operational in Bletchley Park the home of Allied WW II codebreaking.
The question of what is the worlds first computer is less a question
of history than a question of definition.
The Mark 1 at
Manchester (1948) is a strong contender.
A view of Colossus
Colossus found the wheel settings used by the German Lorenz machine
operator for a particular message. When these had been found, which took
about two hours, they were plugged up on the Tunny machine. It was this
machine which actually deciphered the message.
This is the Tunny room in Bletchley Park in 1945.
Colossus, hardware details
Input:
cipher text
punched onto 5 hole paper tape read at 5,000 characters per second by
optical reader
Output:
Buffered onto relays: Typewriter printing onto paper roll
Processor:
Memory 5 characters of 5 bits held in a shift register.
Clock speed 5kc/s derived from input tape sprocket
holes. Internally generated bit streams totalling 501 bits in rings of
lengths equal to the number of mechanical lugs on each of the 12 Lorenz
wheels. A large number of pluggable logic gates. 20 decade counters
arranged as 5 by 4 decades. 2,500 valves.
Power supplies
+200v to -150v at up to 10A.
Power consumption
4.5KWatt
Size:
Two banks of racks 7ft 6inches high by 16ft wide spaced 6 ft apart.
Bedstead, 7ft 6inches high 4ft wide by 10ft long
Colossus, operating cycles
The basic machine cycle: read
a character from tape, get bits from bit stream generators, perform up
to 100 logic operations, clock result into decade counters.
The cycle determined by the input tape: The intercepted
enciphered text tape is joined into a continuous loop with
about 150 blank characters in the join. Specially punched
start and stop holes indicate the beginning and end of the
cipher text.
On receipt of start hole pulse: Start bit
stream generators and send sampling pulses to reader output. Execute
basic machine cycle until receipt of stop hole pulse: Staticise counter
states onto relays. After a delay, reset counters and reset bit stream
generators to a new start position.
Colossus programming
All programmes hard wired, some permanently, some pluggable.
Conditional jumping possible between
alternative programmes depending on counter outputs.
The Rebuild
Work on the rebuild started two years
ago with the collection of all available information about Colossus,
including a series of official photographs taken in 1945.
The first
stage was to produce accurate machine drawings of the frames for
Colossus (all the original machine drawings had been burnt in 1960).
This involved three months of eyestrain pouring over the photographs and
using 3D projections to transfer the details to a CAD system, EasyCad
running on a 486 PC.
Next problem was the optical paper tape reader system. The details
of this are not shown in any of the photographs. However I managed to
locate Dr Arnold Lynch who designed the reader system in 1942. Although
well into his 80's Dr Lynch came to my house and using my CAD system we
re-engineered the reader system to his original specifications. Then I
built it and here it is.
It uses original Colossus hard vacuum photocells, shown here on the
left and a mask onto which the image of the tape is projected by a
Colossus lense.
All the racks are now in place.
Here are some of the decade counters.
We are also rebuilding the Tunny machine.
The current state of Colossus: Jan 96
Examples of most
of the circuit panels are now working and the whole machine is working
at one bit level.
We are now rapidly cloning circuit panels to
populate all the racks.
I need lots more valves: EF36, 37 or 37A
pentodes, 6J5 triodes, 6V6 tetrodes and GT1C gas filled triode
thyratrons. The 6J5's and 6V6's should be the large glass versions to
look right.
Please send any contributions, valves or money, to me (Tony Sale)
at "The Colossus Rebuild Project, 15 Northampton Road, Bromham, Beds
MK43 8QB" tel: 01234 822788 email:
TSale@qufaro.demon.co.uk
Come and see the Colossus Rebuild, the Lorenz machine and codebreaking
exhibitions in Bletchley Park.
This page was created by Tony Sale
(tsale@qufaro.demon.co.uk)
of the Bletchley Park Trust, and
has been modified by Jeff Goldberg
(J.Goldberg@Cranfield.ac.uk)
of the Cranfield University Computer
Centre.
Title: Cryptome
Cryptome
JYA/Urban
Deadline
OpEd
_______________________________________________________________________________________
File Topic Date
_______________________________________________________________________________________
sib.htm Scientists in Black February 3, 1998
CAP The Cryptographic Analysis Program (offsite) February 2, 1998
Arne Beurling The Geheimschreiber Secret (offsite) February 2, 1998
Army Stegano US Army Steganography (offsite) February 2, 1998
<A HREF="http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/ccc/bpark/colossus.htm
">Colossus Rebuilding Colossus (offsite) February 2, 1998
Frode Crypto Cryptology Papers (offsite) February 2, 1998
jimbell9.htm Jim Bell Update February 2, 1998
echelon-boost NSA Surveillance System Boosted (offsite) February 2, 1998
cn020298.txt Crypto News February 2, 1998
bxa020298.txt BXA Meet on Export Rules and Procedures February 2, 1998
cs020298.txt Rules to Challenge Customs Seizures (63K) February 2, 1998
usg020298.txt USG Secret Meets February 2, 1998
echelon.htm NSA Global Surveillance System February 2, 1998
cathedral.htm The Cathedral and the Bazaar February 1, 1998
natsec-rule.htm Protection of National Security Information February 1, 1998
47cfr216.txt National Communications Issuance System (106K) February 1, 1998
47cfr213.txt Emergency Telecomms Precedence System (17K) February 1, 1998
47cfr202.txt National Security Emergency Plans & Ops (27K) February 1, 1998
47cfr201.txt Policy for Telecomms During Emergencies (12K) February 1, 1998
44cfr336.txt Facilities for National Security Emergency (14K) February 1, 1998
44cfr334.txt FEMA Graduated Mobilization Response (14K) February 1, 1998
32cfr322.txt Privacy Act Exemption for NSA Records (40K) February 1, 1998
32cfr299.txt National Security Agency FOIA Program (8K) February 1, 1998
32cfr2101.txt National Security Council FOIA Requests (24K) February 1, 1998
32cfr185.txt Military Support to Civil Authorities (52K) February 1, 1998
31cfr9.txt Effects of Imported Articles on National Security February 1, 1998
22cfr124.txt Contracts, Off-Shore Buys, Defense Services (42K) February 1, 1998
22cfr123.txt Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles (51K) February 1, 1998
22cfr121.txt United States Munitions List (92K) February 1, 1998
_______________________________________________________________________________________
ntia-dnsdrft.htm Draft Proposal for New Domain Name System January 30, 1998
korczak.txt Boris Korczak: CIA Agent Seeks Payment January 30, 1998
pm87.txt Prez on Terrorist Threat to Middle East Peace January 30, 1998
leahy-wipo.txt Senator Leahy on Ratifying WIPO Treaties January 30, 1998
32cfr147.txt DoD: Policies for Access to Classified Info January 30, 1998
32cfr148.txt DoD: Facilities for Storing Classified Info January 30, 1998
32cfr149.txt DoD: National Policy on Technical Surveillance January 30, 1998
ntia012798.htm RFC: Self-Regulation for Privacy Protection January 30, 1998
cylinked.htm Latest: Cylinked to Organized Crime? January 29, 1998
websoft-warn.htm Web Software Warning January 29, 1998
scant-peril.htm U.S. Spy Agencies Pauline Peril January 29, 1998
mossburg.htm E-Comm Forum on E-Authentication and DigSig January 29, 1998
pollard.htm Bankers O Table on E-Authentication and DigSig January 29, 1998
brown.htm Secret Service on Financial Instruments Fraud Janaury 29, 1998
rpk-hack.htm Invite to Hack RPK InvisiMail January 29, 1998
nrc012998.txt Generic Letter on Y2K Readiness for Nuke Plants January 29, 1998
fc012998.txt FinCEN RFC on Information Collection January 29, 1998
dtc012998.txt Arms Export to Saudi Arabia January 29, 1998
nsa-etc-nf.htm NSA, Echelon, Trade & Crypto/Netscape & Fortify January 28, 1998
dod012898.txt DoD Blacklist of Higher Education January 28, 1998
47usc1002.txt Interception of Digital and Other Communications January 28, 1998
cn012898.txt Crypto News January 28, 1998
cn012798.txt Crypto News January 27, 1998
bxa-fy98.txt BXA Funding FY 1998 January 27, 1998
cia-tsang.htm CIA Concedes Spying on Americans January 26, 1998
atpc.htm EU-Parliament: Technologies of Political Control January 26, 1998
us-crypto.htm US Crypto Policy January 25, 1998
pg-nzcrypto.htm New Zealand Crypto Policy January 24, 1998
ra-ukcrypto.htm UK Crypto Policy January 24, 1998
whp012398.htm Payne/Morales vs. NSA: Reply to Defendant January 23, 1998
kellner.htm Intellectuals and New Technologies (66K) January 23, 1998
bxa012398.txt BXA Penalizes Export Violator January 23, 1998
osd012398.txt Compensation of North Viet-Imprisoned Operatives January 23, 1998
dod012398.txt Defense Dept Secret Meets January 23, 1998
walton-pk.htm GCHQ: The Pre-History of Public Key Cryptography January 22, 1998
primer The Proliferation Primer (offsite) January 22, 1998
sh105-238.txt Proliferation and US Export Controls (196K) January 22, 1998
sh105-267.txt Safety and Reliability of US Nukes (347K) January 22, 1998
acda012298.txt Arms Control Secret Meet January 22, 1998
pd012298.txt Prez Notice on Mideast Terrorism Emergency January 22, 1998
bia012298.txt Rule on Indian Casinos January 22, 1998
cn012198.txt Crypto News January 21, 1998
fc98.htm Financial Cryptography '98 January 20, 1998
doj-ssgsup.htm Supplement to Fed Guide for Seizing Computers January 20, 1998
cn-netreg.htm New Chinese Internet Regulations January 20, 1998
pg-get-MSkey.htm How to Recover Private Keys for Microsoft Wares January 20, 1998
ietf-dea-97.htm IETF Draft Encryption Algorithms 1997 January 20, 1998
radio-rec.htm Update: Locating Radio Receivers; Encoder Stolen January 20, 1998
pipenet.htm PipeNet Description January 20, 1998
dod012098.txt Defense Dept Secret Meets January 20, 1998
bernstein12.htm Transcript of Bernstein Hearing January 19, 1998
fbi-umbc.htm Barry Smith (FBI) to Speak on Encryption Policy January 18, 1998
de-snoop.htm Update: German Surveillance State January 17, 1998
bxa-wa-rule.htm Update 2: BXA Rule on the Wassenaar Arrangement January 16, 1998
pd98-10.htm Prez OKs China's Nuclear Controls January 16, 1998
tcryptol Theory of Cryptography Library (offsite) January 16, 1998
cn011698.htm Crypto News January 16, 1998
nsasuit8.htm USA/NSA Responds to Payne/Morales Motion Janaury 16, 1998
dod011698.txt Defense Dept Secret Meets January 16, 1998
bxa011398.txt Materials Advisory Meet January 15, 1998
crypto-kong.htm Announcing Crypto Kong January 15, 1998
occ-dstc.htm OCC OKs CA as Authorized Banking Activity January 14, 1998
aes-980820 Advanced Encryption Standard Conference (offsite) January 14, 1998
ustr010898.txt Update: Telecommunications Trade Agreements January 14, 1998
rc2.htm Rivest Describes RC2 Encryption Algorithm January 13, 1998
fc011398.txt FinCEN Regulates Card Clubs January 13, 1998
ta011298.txt Key Management Infrastructure Meet January 12, 1998
nist011298.txt Transmission-Electron Microscopy Meet January 12, 1998
doa011298.txt Army Hazard Containment Invention January 12, 1998
gps-jam.htm GPS Jamming January 11, 1998
arthur.htm The Force of An Idea: Theory of USA v. Microsoft January 10, 1998
RSA-stego.htm Batch RSA for Stego Data January 9, 1998
batch-DSA.htm Batch DSA January 9, 1998
cell-track.htm Update 2: Mobile Cell Phone Surveillance January 9, 1998
fiat-rsa.htm Fiat's Batch RSA January 9, 1998
aes010798.htm Update: Advanced Encryption Standard January 9, 1998
doj010998.txt RFC: USA v. IBM/STK Antitrust Suit January 9, 1998
bmd010898.txt Ballistic Missile Defense Secret Meet January 9, 1998
nih010898.txt Commercialization of Medical Data January 9, 1998
fas-pde Prez Directives/Executive Orders (offsite) January 7, 1998
ussc-ecopy.htm Sentencing for Electronic Copyright Violations January 6, 1998
ussc010698.txt RFC: US Sentencing Guidelines (254K) January 6, 1997
mercier.htm Terrorists, WMD, and the US Army Reserve January 6, 1998
terror-rnd.htm US Counterterrorism R&D Program January 6, 1998
belet Bob East Letter on AP/Jim Bell/IRS (offsite) January 6, 1998
pitfalls Schneier: Security Pitfalls in Crypto (offsite) January 5, 1998
dsb010598.txt Defense Science Board Secret Meets January 5, 1998
ntia010598.txt Funds for Public Telecommunications January 5, 1998
cn010598.txt Electronic Surveillance News January 5, 1998
csda.htm Cypherpunks Smartcard Developer Association January 4, 1998
aimd-98-21.htm Executive Guide: Info Security Management (139K) January 3, 1998
blast-mono.htm Blast Resistant Doors Monograph January 3, 1998
tempest-door.htm Electromagnetic Shielding/TEMPEST Door January 3, 1998
ehj.htm Banned Basque Video: Democratic Alternative January 3, 1998
fda010298.htm Policy for External Penile Rigidity Devices January 2, 1998
doe010298.htm Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Plan January 2, 1998
dos010298.txt Meet on Global Communications and Info Policy January 2, 1998
doa010298.txt Army Science Board Meet January 2, 1998
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Cryptomb 2
June-December 1997
Cryptomb
1
To May 31 1997
(site
stats)
DoE: Pay Bill
Payne
DoJ: Free Jim Bell
Return to February 1998
Return to “bill payne <billp@nmol.com>”
1998-02-03 (Tue, 3 Feb 1998 22:47:32 +0800) - Gilbert Vernam - bill payne <billp@nmol.com>