1998-03-01 - chemical, biological, or radiation (CBR) weapons

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From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
To: tcmay@got.net
Message Hash: 02ea4a534a3cfddd170a8e3ba22807883fd3136cc0cd1ca6a833661a6cd5f138
Message ID: <34F8ED42.3986@nmol.com>
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UTC Datetime: 1998-03-01 05:11:32 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 28 Feb 1998 21:11:32 -0800 (PST)

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From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 1998 21:11:32 -0800 (PST)
To: tcmay@got.net
Subject: chemical, biological, or radiation (CBR) weapons
Message-ID: <34F8ED42.3986@nmol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Saturday 2/28/98 9:44 PM

I transcribe some of what I got in the mail today.

Volume 9, Number 4, 1997

  MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY

  The Official Journal of the 
  Division of Military Psychology
  American Psychological Association

  Special Issue:  Effects of Chemical Protective
                  Clothing of Military Performance
  Guest Editors:  Gerald P. Krueger and
                  Louis E. Banderet

         Psychological Aspects of Chemical Defense and Warfare

	James W. Stokes
	U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School
	Fort Sam Houston, Texas

	Louis E. Banderet
	U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
	Natick, Massachusetts

  Concerns about chemical, biological, or radiation (CBR) weapons  and 
  their potential for warfare can be very stressful.  Such concerns
subject
  people to unfamiliar threats in highly ambiguous situations, in which 
  people feel they may be wronged or they are helpless.  Maladaptive
  psychological overreactions or underreactions may result.  Such
reactions
  to chemical warfare are illustrated with the experience from World War
I,
  the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 1995 terrorist attack in the Tokyo
  subway.  General principles of psychology suggest strategies and
tactics for
  training and materiel development that should enhance military
performance
  and reduce maladaptive stress in CBR threat situations.  Some of these
practices
  may be relevant to nonmilitary law enforcement and relief agencies
that manage
  CBR threats.

page 395.

Now I transcribe some of the more relevant stuff.

  Effects of Chemical Protective Clothing on Military Performance:

  A Review of the Issues

  Gerald P. Krueger
  Star Mountain, Inc.
  Alexandria, Virginia

  Lous E. Banderet
  U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
  Natick, Massachusetts
	
  This review in this special issue of Military Psychology on the
effects of chemical
  protective clothing (CPC) on military performance provide a historical
perspective
  on continued anxieties over likely use of battlefield
chemical-biological weapons and
  summarizes significant concerns of military personnel weaning CPC in
training and
  combat.  This review describes pschophysiological stresses such
protective ensembles
  have on personnel and how these affect military performance, and it
summarizes major
  military psychological research program on the effect of wearing CPC. 
This article
  reviews what is known about wearing CPC, describes future CPC
developments, and 
  identifies domains for improved military training with CPC.

              MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT 
              OF C-B WEAPONS

  There are many medical, physiological and psychological reactions from
exposure to
  chemical-biological (C-B) weapons.  Many bio-warfare agents and most
chemical weapons
  are designed to interfere with function of the nervous system and to
disrupt normal control
  of vital organ systems that sustain life.  For example,  the more
common chemical war
  nerve agents involve organophosphate compounds,  similar to
insecticides, that inhibit 
  cholinesterase enzymes throughout the body.  Because cholinesterase
hydrolyzes 
  acetylcholine where ever liberated, this inhibition  results in
excessive concentrations of 
  acetylcholine at various sites - from the ending of the
parasympathetic nerves to smooth
  muscles of the iris, ciliary body, bronchi, gastrointestinal trace,
bladder, and blood  vessels;
  to secretary gland of the respiratory tract' and to endings of the
sympathetic nerves to sweat
  glands (Newhouse, 1987; Simmons et at 1989).  Exposure to large
amounts of nerve agent
  may lead to loss of muscle control, twitching, paralysis,
unconsciousness, convulsions,
  coma, and even death.  The most common cause of death after acute
exposure is respiratory
  arrest.  Death may occur within minutes or take several hours.
     In terms of psychological functioning, moderate but nonlethal
exposure to nerve agent 
  produces severe impairment in cognition, vigilance, memory and
language.  Acute
  intoxication produces confusion, drowsiness, and difficulty in
concentration (Newhouse,
  1987).  These impairment make it difficult to continue to perform may
soldier tasks.
  Effects on cognition may persist after only a slight exposure. 
Performance improvement
  appears to correlate with the body's regeneration of
acetycholinesterase, usually requiring
  several months.
    Neurophysychological testing (Newhouse, 1987) reveals that chronic
exposure to 
  organophosphates significantly impairs higher mental function
requiring use of the frontal
  lobes, particularly the left lobe.  Organophosphate poisoning
selectively  impairs memory of 
  recently learned information, and this impairment is likely related to
cholinergic involvement
  in the memory processes.  The effects include defects in long-term
memory, visual searching,
  and response alteration - effects similar to those caused by a frontal
lobotomy.  In chronically
  exposed individuals, speed of task performance and overall cognitive
efficiency also declines.
  Persistent visual impairments are reported in workers poisoned with
anticholinesterase 
  insecticides, and acute poisoning impair oculomotor function. 
Poisoning with nerve agents may
  also cause psychiatric disturbances such as depression.
    Use of C-B weapons results not only in large number of physical
casualties on the battlefield
  by in may psychological casualties as well.  Concern over the mere
threat that C-B weapons 
  might be used raises battlefield anxiety of combatants and can produce
a level of fear 
  disproportionate to that evoked by countless alternative conventional
battlefield means of
  killing or maiming, such a with guns, artillery, and bombs.  Such
anxieties can create large
  numbers of psychological stress casualties contribution to unit
ineffectiveness on the battlefield
  and combat losses.  Such adverse emotions may also cause posttraumatic
stress disorders after
  combat ceases.
		
		DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERMEASURES
		FOR THE COMBAT THEATER

   Modern military forces recognize the C-B weapons can be the
attention-getting equivalent
  of a poor country's nuclear weapons.  Such weapons can be
counter-acted, however, and
  concerned nations prepare their forces to preserve their health and
safety against C-B
  warfare.   ...

I will send a complete copy to John Young.

So I skip to the next section.

			THE THREAT OF C-B WARFARE

  Although biological warfare was used centuries ago by the Romans and
was used in the
  14th century by the Tartars, who catapulted plague-infected bodies
into cities under
  siege (Hewish, 1997),  military forces have made scant use of
biological warfare in modern
  times.  The more recent innovation of chemical warfare dates to 1914
when the French used
  tear gas against unprotected German forces, who in turn introduced
chlorine and phosgene
  in 1915 and mustard gas in 1917 against the British, who sustained
14,000 casualties in
  3 months (Hewish, 1997).  May World Ware I soldiers were grotesquely
injured or died in gas
  war trenches in France and Russia;  Russia's gas casualties exceed a
half million, including
  50,000 fatalities (Westerhoff, 1980).
    In 1925, many countries signed a Geneva Protocol prohibiting first
use of chemical and
  bacteriological weapons.  However, during the 1930s, several
countries, notably Germany,
  encouraged chemists to develop chemical weapons as a by-product of
insecticide research
  production.  By World War II, Germany and powers stockpiled huge
caches of chemical, but
  probably due to fear of in-kind retaliation, chemical weapons were not
used in World War II.
  After the war, Germany's organophoshporous arsenal fell into Russian
hands, and for the next
  50 years, military forces relegated C-B warfare efforts to relatively
quiet development programs
  for future battlefields.
    Since World War II, C-B weapons have been employed several times on
a relatively small
  scale.  In the 1970s, the Vietnamese used chemical and "yellow rain"
biological agents in 
  Cambodian jungles, the Soviets used chemical in Afghanistan (U.S.
Department of State,
  1980), Iraq used sulfur mustard  and other chemical in the Iran-Iraq
conflict (1979-1980),
  and Iraq used chemical in 1980 - this time against its own people, the
northern Kurds 
  (Studeville, 1997).
    There have been periodic threats to use chemical weapons on a grand
scale.  In the 
  1970s, the Warsaw Pact possessed huge stockpiles of chemical weapons (
mostly soman,
  cyanide, and mustard gas), and Soviet chemical warfare teams openly
conducted extensive
  training in gas warfare tactics.  Such readiness for large scale C-B
warfare was underscored 
  in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, as Iraq threatened to use chemical
(sarin) and biologicals
  (anthrax spores) against coalition forces and possibly against
neighboring cities in Saudi 
  Arabia and Israel (Begley, Barry,  & Hager, 1991).  By January 1991,
Saudi Arabia had
  predug 50,000 graves planned for burying civilian (noncombat)
casualties expected to 
  succumb to Iraqi chemical poisoning from anticipated rocket attacks on
Saudi cities or
  aerosols drifting from the battlefields (Kaplan, 1991).
    Although Iraq did not unleash such chemical, and the battles were
ultimately short, 
  many U.S. military personnel may been exposed to chemical during the
March 1991
  destruction of Iraqi weapon stockpiled (mostly sarin) near Khamisiyah,
Iraq (Stuteville,
  1997).  The U. S. government continue to investigate whether exposures
to chemical 
  agents may have contributed to the so-called Gulf War illnesses
experienced by many 
  U.S. military veterans of that encounter.  Exposure of soldiers to
multiple chemical and
   and environmental stressors may be linked to psychophysiological
illnesses that manifest
  in symptomatology such as disabling fatigue, insomnia, malaise, joint
and muscle pains, 
  skin sores, hair loss, and gastrointestinal and respiratory
difficulties (Brown &
  Priest, 1996).  Others asset that U.S. military personnel were exposed
to Iraq chemical 
  warfare from Scud missiles, artillery and aircraft (Stuteville, 1997)

			PUBLIC CONCERN

  Open, frank, public news of existent military chemical stockpiles,
proliferation of chemical
  or biological weaponry, and periodic 'saber-ratting' threats to use
such weapons amplify world
  public concerns over the enormity of what someday could be a horrific
chemical or biological
  calamity.  Unprotected civilian populations fear they may be
deliberately attacked by 
  chemical and biological weapons or inadvertently by aerosol warfare
agents drifting into
  populated areas of a battlefield.  Disastrous incident like the one in
1984 at a chemical 
  factory in Bhopal, India, which killed over 2,000 people and sickened
countless others, 
  sensitized citizenry to the lethal potential of such chemical
compounds.  In 1995, terrorist
  attacks on the Tokyo subway, and news media discussion of possible use
of nerve agents in
  terrorist disruption of public gathering like the 1992 and 1996
Olympics, heightened Public
  fears over such chemical incidents have become almost visceral.  News
of recent advances
  in genetic technologies (Dando, 1997)  suggest use of future
biological weapons with
  unprecedented insidiousness and specificity is possible.  Moreover,
the mass media and media
  expert sources remind the public that the United States  may not be
adequately prepared or
  trained to defend itself against chemical or biological warfare (Beal,
1997).  ...

Send more money, of course.

Banderet's Ph. D. thesis article is

              Visual Marking Following Transient Adaptation

	Journal of the Optical Society of America, Vol 51, 7 955-958
	July 1971

Banderet has worked for US Army Institute of Environmental Medicine
since 1971.

Banderet is another of my former Ph. D. students. In human factors, not
computer science.

US soldiers, of course, need some tranquilizers to calm them down is the
face of such
threats.  To improve battlefield performance.

Keep in mind guys that the US goverment is not above killing a bunch of
its
own citizens for its own BUSINESS goals.

Keep up-wind
bill

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